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1. Executive Summary 
 
The GICHD were requested by OKPCC to provide an external and independent 
review of the outstanding EOD requirements within Kosovo. The findings of the 
review will be used to assess the future EOD / Mine Action resource requirements. 
The review was conducted over a ten day period in August 2006 with the prime 
tasks of assessing the completeness of the task identification and recording systems 
used for work planning. Within the Kosovo Programme the majority of the survey 
and clearance activity, involving in excess of 4,500 Dangerous Areas reports, 
including those that proved to be duplicate reports, had been coordinated by the 
UN MACC during the period 1999 –2001. Since that period the OKPCC EOD 
Management Cell have been responsible for managing the remaining activities with 
a focus on dealing with the residual contamination and establishing appropriate 
resources for longer term ‘low priority’ tasks and response.  
 
In outline, the operational management process within the EOD Management Cell 
of the OKPCC involved the identification of Dangerous Areas, and then where 
appropriate, the tasking of a demining organisation to clear the area. The record of 
how Dangerous Areas were dealt with is recorded by a paper work trail of 
operational reports which are filed in a ‘Task Dossier’. A Task Dossier may contain 
several Dangerous Areas if they are geographically close or linked to coordinated 
tasking. The ‘tasks’ were specific operational tasks which had been allocated by the 
mine action centre (now the OKPPC EOD Management Section) to demining 
organisations. The information product from the individual Task Dossiers is 
transferred to the Information Management System for Mine Action, IMSMA, for 
ease of access and analysis. When completed the Task Dossiers are archived after 
the information has been incorporated in to IMSMA. 
 
Some doubt about the conclusions of the UN assessment of future tasks and the 
quality of previous mine action operations had been raised by one of the demining 
organisations which led to this independent review. Currently there are three 
demining organisations working in Kosovo in addition to the emergency EOD 
elements of KFOR; these are the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the HALO Trust 
and the Mine Awareness Trust (MAT). The review team carried out an information 
management audit to assess whether the recorded information was complete and 
justified the assessed future operational plans. The Terms of Reference for the 
Review Mission are attached at Annex A. 
 
In detail the review team conducted a systematic review of the Task Dossiers held 
by the EOD Management Section to determine whether appropriate actions have 
been undertaken to declare Dangerous Areas (DAs) as being either cleared, 
cancelled, or to designate the DA as being a future clearance task. Due to the 
limited time of the evaluation a sample of 156 Dangerous Areas or Minefields (not 
counting CBU strike duplicates) included in 90 different Task Dossiers were 
investigated through the application of an agreed methodology. The selection of 
Task Dossiers did not follow coincidental or average sampling procedures, but was 
guided by the review of a list of tasks that one of the demining organisations had 
identified as questionable or problematic. In addition 29 Dangerous Areas or 
Minefields that were included in 16 Task Dossiers were chosen through 
coincidental sampling. It was agreed by all parties to the assessment, that the 
amount of samples was sufficient to make a clear judgement of the situation, this 
was tested through one field mission to investigate questions raised over seven 
specific areas. The detailed methodology of the assessment is described in chapter 4 
of this report. 
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The product of the analyses of the Task Dossiers, including a detailed list of 
discrepancies as they were encountered, is attached as Annex B to this report. 
 
The tables in Annex B also include recommendations for remedial action, either 
office based or field based depending on the completeness of the information. A 
total of three sites that need to be revisited have been identified during the review, 
of which one is considered by the EOD Management Cell as low priority. Thirteen of 
the requested Task Dossiers were not available for review and the answers to the 
questions remain open,  additional sites may need to be added for field assessment 
when they are located and analysed. The results of the Task Dossier assessment are 
further analysed in Chapter 5 of this report. 
 
The information contained within the Task Dossiers has been compared with the 
information contained in IMSMA, and any areas of discrepancy have been recorded 
in an extra column of the assessment tables in Annex B. Additionally, general 
findings are described in Chapter 5. Recommendations for specific remedial action 
in each case are included in the tables, while general recommendations are listed 
below. 
 
Overall, IMSMA reflected the information from the Task Dossiers reasonably 
accurately, but did not always contain all details. Most of the discrepancies were 
minor, but problems were identified in seven cases, in which the status of a DA had 
to change from “Complete” to “Low Priority KPC” or “EOD Response”. However, 
these were assessed as mostly very remote, low priority surface cleared CBU strike 
areas, which do not require attention at this stage. Long term, their status could be 
reconfirmed periodically by KPC. 
 
As an additional investigation, the review team also looked at the Task Dossiers 
containing tasks that remain to be completed to confirm their number and priority. 
This totals to 30 future tasks for clearance, of which one could possibly be 
considered as a priority. The results were compared to the assessment made by 
UNMAS earlier this year.1 The UNMAS list was found to be accurate and in line with 
the Task Dossiers held by OKPCC operations section. Subtracting the tasks 
completed in the meantime and those that are currently worked on, 16 tasks 
remain open from that list for KPC clearance, none of them are categorised as being 
a high priority by the EOD Management Cell. One more task came in after the 
UNMAS assessment had been made. The review of the Task Dossiers and IMSMA 
brought up another 6 DAs, which were indicated as “Future Tasks”, but not yet 
listed. One of these tasks does not require attention at this stage. Furthermore, the 
7 tasks mentioned above for eventual re-assessment could be added. 
 
Survey or community liaison tasks identified for re-visit include three areas 
identified through the review, plus 7 potential areas reported through OSCE (see 
Chapter 6d, Chapter 7 and Annex C for details). 
 
The current nomenclature (categories) being applied to the status of tasks has been 
assessed as part of the review. Recommendations for categorising the tasks in 
accordance with mine action sector standards are made in Chapter 6e. The main 
change recommended has been to summarize and combine the terms “Future 
Task”, “Low Priority KPC” and “EOD Response”  all as “Future Task”. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Report on the Landmine and Cluster Bomb Threat in 2006. Situation Analyses and Evaluation of the Kosovo 
Protection Corps Capacity to address the Problem, UNMAS, 14 May 2006 
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As a result of the above mentioned investigations, and of the other assessments 
made which are detailed in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 of this report, it can be 
concluded that mines/UXO generally do not impede movement or socio-economic 
development in Kosovo. This does not ignore the fact that in some rural areas the 
perceived or real threat of mines/UXO may affect the population. 
 
Accident statistics indicate that the threat is low, and also that the population is well aware of 
it through mine risk education. The highest threat seems to come from abandoned munitions 
like hand grenades which when reported, are dealt with well through emergency EOD 
response tasking either by KFOR or KPC. The attention of the Review Team had been 
drawn to review accident information and the assessment of that information by the 
UN and by the EOD Management Section. Whilst there have been a number of 
tragic accidents that have been classified by the UN as ‘being caused by tampering’ 
(such as an incident where 6 children were victims) the instances of accidents as a 
result of munitions in new or old Dangerous Areas are few. The number of 
Emergency EOD call outs dealt with by KFOR and KPC provides an indication of  
the comparatively high levels of munitions in circulation. Comment on accidents is 
provided in section 6.  
  
There does not seem to be a large scale unkown problem with mines/UXO in 
Kosovo. Dealing with the outstanding DAs should be well within the capacity of 
KPC. Planned gradual reduction of KFOR EOD and the conclusion of international 
demining NGO support has been factored in to plans to increase the resources and 
activities of KPC.  
 
This Review concludes that the general situation assessment made by the UN in 
2001 does not need to be changed or rectified. This view corresponds with that of 
the MAT and the KPC.   
 
The assessment team appreciated that the review of the Task Dossiers has not been 
exhaustive. It should be systematically continued by OKPCC EOD to include a full 
information audit of all task dossiers and the IMSMA records as part of a regular, 
planned, ongoing management activity. 
 
Whilst the overall information management systems work well, a detailed list of   
shortcomings in OKPCC EOD filing and data management have been identified, and 
detailed recommendations for remedial action are proposed below. 
 
2. Recommendations 
 
1.OKPCC EOD should task KPC to conduct surveys at the locations summarized in 
Annex C of this report. 
 
2.OKPCC EOD / KPC should be more pro-active in order to ensure that they receive 
information on Dangerous Areas. This includes: 
 
? Enhanced community liaison, especially collection of information on mine 
accidents with animals. 
? Visits to Municipalities to ensure the DA reporting system is understood and 
working. 
? Regular meetings with KFOR  and OSCE staff to ensure the national DA 
reporting system is understood and working. 
? Follow-up of the OSCE survey reports. 
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? Trawl for and find out all relevant information available within Demining 
Organisations collective staff memory.  
? Contact the Team Leader from HALO Trust who claims to have knowledge of 
minefields, and ensure that information is correctly processed. 
?  A renewal of proactive communication with the Albanian Mine Action Centre 
(AMAC) and Danish Church Aid (DCA) about the situation on the Albanian 
border. 
? Continuation of the systematic survey process (ongoing since 1999). 
 
3. OKPCC EOD Operations should consider the following recommendations: 
 
? Completing the ‘follow-up’ actions indicated in Table 2. 
? Up date the ‘master registry list’ of Task Dossiers so that the numerical 
sequence can be followed and all Task Dossiers be accounted for. 
? The “Future Tasks” identified through the Task Dossier review and IMSMA 
research should be added to the “Future Task” list, as detailed in Annex C. 
? Reconstitute the missing documents and Task Dossiers and assess them 
with the help of the developed review methodology. 
? Continue the review process of Task Dossiers with the help of the developed 
methodology, looking carefully for any inconsistencies between the task 
dossiers and IMSMA records. Create summarizing cover pages for each Task 
Dossier. Rather than compiling tables as in this Review Mission, make any 
IMSMA changes directly and document them. Also document which Task 
Dossiers have been reviewed. 
? Having undertaken the above step, cross-reference the DAs covered by all 
Task Dossiers to those in IMSMA and identify an accurate list of DAs that do 
not have an associated Task Dossier. Ensure that these too have been 
appropriately closed and documented. 
? Add the centralised survey reports and ‘ops memos’ to the individual Task 
Dossiers.  
? Link the information contained in “Operation Normal Life” to the Task 
Dossiers. 
? Improve the instructions from operations to the data entry clerk to ensure 
proper data transfer and an auditable record of decisions, for example by 
using written instructions– even if it is the same person. File the instructions 
for follow-up. 
? When using IMSMA for task identification, take the IMSMA ‘status’ as 
reference, not the IMSMA “confirmed clear” box. Ensure that all Dangerous 
Areas have a ‘status’ indicated in IMSMA and where not currently indicated 
that the status if reviewed before being entered.  
? Create proper records before human memory moves on. Transfer all 
knowledge to the Task Dossiers, into IMSMA and record the process in 
Standard Work Procedures (SWP). 
? Write simple SWPs on such topics as Priority Setting and Reaction on 
Requests. There is a need to maintain an auditable record of management 
decisions. 
? Apply the agreed revised nomenclature for the status of tasks. 
? Consider differentiating between clearance requirement and low priority 
residual risk (action only when impact changes) for “Future Tasks”. 
? Re-assess impact of low priority DAs systematically. 
? Assess regularly if the status of ‘KFOR Responsibility’ tasks have changed. 
? Re-communicate Kosovo EOD reporting and communication lines regularly. 
? Consider writing a guideline on demolition drills for the use of SM systems. 
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? Consider adopting the procedures developed in Lebanon for random 
minefields, if singular mines are found or accidents with human beings / 
animals are reported, (copies of procedures provided). 
? Document the human resource / equipment needs of KPC for the coming 
years. Specifically consider equipment maintenance and remote areas. 
? Search for the documents that record the operational follow-up of mine 
accidents that were not caused through tampering. 
? Create a workplan to implement these recommendations. 
 
4. OKPCC should discuss with OKPCC EOD the need for an office manager function 
to support the work of the EOD cell. The office manager would ensure proper  
internal management procedures, for example conduct quality assurance of 
filing/documentation and IMSMA data entry, write SWPs etc. The need for a 
Community Liaison Officer as assistant to the Mine Risk Education Officer should 
also be assessed. 
 
5. In an endeavour to transfer responsibility to local capacity and built-up 
structures following the UN strategic goals for Kosovo, KPC should conduct as 
many of the identified tasks as possible, all of them co-ordinated through OKPCC. 
This includes KFOR EOD tasks, which would indicate the need for a senior EOD 
course for KPC. 
 
6. An external monitoring visit by UNMAS or an external organisation should be 
conducted once per year to ensure the implementation of the above mentioned 
recommendations. OKPCC should consider budgeting for this. 
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3. Introduction 
 
The OKPCC requested the GICHD to carry out an assessment into specific aspects 
operational mine and UXO clearance activities in Kosovo. One GICHD staff member, 
Mr Phil Bean, and one technical consultant of the GICHD, Ms Vera Bohle, carried 
out this assessment during July/August 2006.  
 
According to the Terms of Reference (see Annex A), the OKPCC required an 
assessment of all Task Dossiers held by the EOD Management Section, to ensure 
that appropriate action has been undertaken to either clear or cancel tasks, or to 
designate them for future clearance by the KPC. The purpose of this assessment 
has been to determine the residual mine and UXO threat within Kosovo, which in 
turn will enable an assessment of the KPC EOD capacity to deal with it. 
 
The OKPCC had UNMAS conduct a similar assessment in May 2006. However, one 
of the demining organisations were not satisfied that UNMAS was sufficiently 
independent and doubted the validity of the assessment. For this reason, an 
independent assessment by GICHD had been requested.  
 
The Assessment is written for the OKPCC as a situation report and as a planning 
tool for further action. It is intended to be forward looking but also documents 
lessons learned.  
 
4. Background 
 
The background to the mine and UXO situation in Kosovo and the subsequent 
action by the UN and the OKPCC will not be detailed here, but is adequately 
described in the terms of reference for the assessment mission (see Annex A). 
 
Some additional background information that was relevant for this assessment is 
the following: 
 
Relating to the contamination status in Kosovo. A misunderstanding seems to have 
been produced by press reports in 2001 leading to an interpretation that the last 
existing mine in Kosovo had been cleared when the exodus of the international 
NGOs started. To clarify this misunderstanding, and to outline the goals of the Mine 
Action Programme (MAP) in Kosovo, and the mine / UXO status of Kosovo as 
perceived by the UN Mine Action Coordination Center (MACC) end 2001, the 
following quotes are of relevance: 
 
The objective of the UNMIK mine action programme  
 
“…is to create a situation where mines and UXO no longer pose a serious 
threat to the local population or impede development.”2 
 
The MACC final report 2001 clarifies: 
 
“Whilst the vast majority of minefields have now been cleared or identified, 
there is the possiblitity that some mines will still be found in the future. 
However, it is unlikely that these will be large scale mined areas, and will be 
within the clearance capabilities of the teams trained in Techncial Survey. 
Additionally, in the unlikely event of a large minefield, or a number of large 
                                                 
2 UNMIK Mine Action Programme, Exit Strategy, 3 January 2001 
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mined areas being located in the future, then it will be possible to contract 
specialist assistance as required. Such assistance could include an explosive 
detection dog team or a mechanical asset for specific clearance tasks over 
defined periods of time. This is a more cost-effective solution than 
maintaining these capabilities in the Province when there is little likelihood 
that they will be used on a regular basis.”3 
 
And furthermore: 
 
“The reasoning for this approach is further reinforced by the fact that Kosovo 
has been extensively surveyed by MACC-coordinated teams for more than 
two years, and very few new mined areas have been located in the past 12-18 
months. These new areas have generally been in extremely remote, difficult 
to access areas where the impact of the mines is minimal. In most cases, 
these mines have posed more of a danger to the personnel conducting the 
clearance task, than any members of the civilian population. In such 
circumstances in the future, the requirement to clear the area versus the 
posibility of simply marking the perimeter to warn people of the danger will 
also be a viable option to be considered.”4 
 
The summary of the report outlines: 
 
“At this time (15 December 2001), all known minfields and cluster bomb-
affected areas will have been cleared to an acceptable standard, or identified 
and marked for subsequent clearance by the trained local capacity. This will 
mean that mines and unexploded ordnance will not be an impediment to 
social and economic development in the Province, as the situation will be 
comparable to, or better than the situation that exists in many countries 
throughout Europe.”5 
 
However UNMIK in July 2005 maintained that national capacity required external 
assistance to deal with the problem of ERW: 
 
“ Continued donor funding is needed for the ongoing operations of 
international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and training of KP 
teams, which together have some 250 people involved in the day-to-day 
clearance of mines and UXO” 
 
“ There is still a requirement for International Non-Governmental 
Organisations to be engaged in UXO and mine clearance in Kosovo” 6 
 
As described in the background part of the ToR for this assessment, the work in 
Kosovo was not considered to be finished, but had been transferred to local 
authorities. The MACC had become the EOD cell of the OKPCC, staffed with local 
capacity who has been built up since 1999, supported by international staff who 
had also previously worked long term in the MAP. The KPC became the 
implementing partner for clearance and received progressive training and support. 
KFOR EOD teams continued to conduct small scale clearance and are the main 
resource for emergency EOD response tasks. 
 
                                                 
3 UNMIK Mine Action Programme, Annual Report 2001 
4 UNMIK Mine Action Programme, Annual Report 2001 
5 UNMIK Mine Action Programme, Annual Report 2001 
6 UNMIK  News coverage archieves  July 2005, UNMIK/PR/1392 dated 19 July 2005 
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The assumption had been that the residual threat could be handled by the built up 
KPC capacities and KFOR. The residual risk posed by mines and UXO was 
considered too low to justify the large scale international funding levels, which the 
18 international NGOs and companies previously active in Kosovo had received.  
 
A second aspect seems equally relevant for the assessment: It has been and still is 
the declared overall strategy of the UN mission in Kosovo to transfer responsibility 
as far as possible to local institutions.  
 
“An ambitious policy of transferring further competencies should be 
launched without delay, giving the PISG a greater sense of ownership and 
responsibility as well as accountability. A more coherent and ambitious 
policy of capacity-building is urgently needed….”7 
 
The UNMIK Mission Restructuring Status Report of February 2006 underlines this 
strategy by stressing that  
 
“…the transfer of competencies from UNMIK to the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government is a key UNMIK responsibility pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999)”. 
 
With regard to the deployment of International Organisations or NGOs, the policy is 
described as follows:  
 
“In this regard, in areas where competencies have been transferred or are in 
the process of being transferred or at least plans are being developed and 
implemented to transfer such competencies, it is not encouraged that 
International Organisations or NGOs assume competencies or engage in 
areas where a capacity building may be undermined or transferred 
responsibilities held back and returned unless it has materialised that the 
Kosovan body to which the competencies were transferred has not proven 
able to assume responsibility for such competencies. Unnecessary 
engagement of International Organisations or NGOs needlessly undermines 
local ownership, capacity building and sustainablity of reform efforts.”8 
 
To support this strategy, the co-ordination of donor money is considered vital. 
 
“Given existing financial constraints, faced by both the Kosovo Government 
and the Donor Community in Kosovo, and in order that agreed priorities and 
strategic direction is complement and implementation thereof facilitated, it is 
of vital importance that there is effective donor coordination in Kosovo.”9 
 
Donor engagement should be coordinated 
 
“… to ensure that they are in line with the strategic direction and priorities 
as established by the recognised authorities (UNMIK/PISG) upon agreement 
by stakeholders. There is a system in place which should be utilised.”10 
 
                                                 
7 Eleanor Gordon, Political Advisor to OKPCC, quoting from Eide’s Report to the Secretary General of the UN 
on the situation in Kosovo of 11 August 2004 
8 Eleanor Gordon, Political Advisor to OKPCC, August 2006 
9 Eleanor Gordon,  Political Advisor to OKPCC, August 2006 
10 Eleanor Gordon,  Political Advisor to OKPCC, August 2006 
 12
5. Methodology 
 
To meet the terms of reference, the assessment team used the following 
methodology, (which was agreed by all parties): 
 
Firstly, the method of selection for the Task Dossiers had to be defined. As outlined 
in the response of the GICHD to the OKPCC request, it was not possible in the given 
timeframe to thoroughly investigate all Task Dossiers. The aim was to look at as 
many Task Dossiers as possible, but clear selection criteria had to be agreed upon. 
 
Task Dossier selection would normally have been through applied mathematical 
coincidental sampling or representative sampling. However, it was agreed by all 
parties that the primary focus would be on those Task Dossiers that HALO Trust 
had identified to be potentially problematic following their review of IMSMA. A list of 
contradictions and anomalies had been presented on the first day of the 
assessment, which formed the base for the choice of Task Dossiers. Only after the 
HALO Trust had no more Task Dossiers to propose, coincidental sampling has been 
applied. This sampling process can not be considered scientific or representative, 
but it was meant to address the known concerns and thus to contribute to 
solutions for the problems encountered.  
 
It was furthermore agreed that the Task Dossiers covering known ‘outstanding 
tasks’ would also be reviewed. 
 
Secondly, a method to review the Task Dossiers systematically, covering all points 
requested from the terms of reference, had to be developed. For this purpose, three 
tables were created (see Annex B).  
 
Tables 1a and 1b are descriptive or quantitative, allowing to register the information 
from the Task Dossiers. This includes their documentary completeness as well as a 
comparison with the data contained in IMSMA. It should be noted that Table 1a 
contains an overview of possible Task Dossier content, clearly not all documents are 
needed in each Task Dossier. Nomenclature consistency and the age of survey data 
had been added, but these points proved to be of little value for the assessment, 
because the nomenclature only refered to the terms used for the status of tasks and 
thus did not need a separate investigation for each Task Dossier, and the age of 
survey data only had relevance for the outstanding tasks. 
 
Table 2 is analytical in nature, building on the information contained in Tables 1a 
and 1b. The questions raised are: 
 
? Is the OKPCC file processing and priority classification clear?11 
? Is the information sufficient for a demining agency to conduct the task?12 
? Are the clearance / cancellation documentation and measures appropriate?13 
? Is the OKPCC task status appropriate?14 
                                                 
11 File processing clear: OKPCC internal file administration clear, nomenclature understandable and consistant, 
continuation tasks identified. Priority classification clear (only for current tasks): OKPCC priority setting 
decision trail clear and documented, survey data available (not older than 6 months)  
12 „Sufficient“ is defined as: 1) for survey tasks: DA report avaiblable, 2) for clearance tasks: DA report, Survey 
report or Tasking order available, clear and complete 
13 „Appropriate“ is defined as: 1) for clearance: documentation complete, argumentation understandable. 2) for 
discredited areas: documentation complete, argumentation understandable: Survey conducted, no signs of 
fighting, mines or UXO, interviews with affected persons conducted, area used regularly, no accidents 
14 „Appropriate“ is defined as: documentation is complete, file processing understandable, priority classification 
clear, nomenclature clear, argumentation understandable, no other evidence (accident, new DA report) 
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The qualifying terms “clear”, “sufficient” and “appropriate” were further defined in 
their context, see according footnotes. The analyses resulted in the question 
whether or not ‘follow-up’ action would be required. Three options of follow-up 
action were identified: 1) document research for missing documents, 2) IMSMA 
corrections where discrepancies were identified, and finally 3) (re-)survey of an area. 
 
It needs to be noted that one Task Dossier can contain several different Dangerous 
Areas. The tables are based on the analyses of each Dangerous Area. Only when the 
same CBU strike area had different DA numbers, were they  summarised in table 
1a under “Same DA as”. 
 
The outstanding Task Dossiers were compared to the outstanding tasks listed in 
the Annex of the UNMAS report of May 2006. 
 
In addition, samples from the files containing survey discreditation reports were 
randomly checked. 
 
The Dangerous Areas which were identified by one member of the Task Dossier 
review team for survey follow-up were discussed with all team members and OKPCC 
EOD, in order to integrate all available information and thus to come to common 
conclusions.  
 
In order to keep the work of the assessment process transparent for interested 
parties, not only the EOD cell of OKPCC and the coordinator of the KPC had the 
chance to participate in the research work, but also Matthew Hovell, David Elliot 
and Luan Jaupi of HALO Trust and Mika Toivonen of MAT. David Elliot and Luan 
Jaupi were invited to join the review process as ‘active observers’ and contributed to 
the findings. As requested by the ToR, during the review of the Task Dossiers 
particular emphasis has been given to identifying areas that have been surface 
cleared of CBU, but may still require sub-surface clearance. 
 
In addition to the Task Dossier review, in order to meet the requirement to 
determine the residual mine and UXO threat within Kosovo, i.e. the extent of work 
that remains, and make a judgement on the ability of the KPC EOD capacity to deal 
with it in an appropriate time frame, the following measures were taken: 
 
? Review of mine/UXO related accidents after 2001. 
? Review of requests for clearance from the local population to OKPCC. 
? Review of Operation “Normal Life” reports (samples). 
? Review of the assessments of the UN security section and OSCE regional 
stakeholders with regard to the threat through mines and UXOs. 
? Assessment of the current EOD capacity of KPC and KFOR through 
researching personnel and equipment figures, as well as clearance statistics. 
? Assessment of timeframes between reporting of Dangerous Areas and 
clearance. 
? Assessment of survey capacity and results. 
? Assessment of the future KPC EOD capacity. 
? Assessment of the procedures used by the MACC during the clearance 
between 1999-2001. 
? Interviews with OKPCC EOD and former UN MACC staff (the latter through 
e-mail). 
? Interview with the Programme Manager of DCA, a mine clearance NGO 
operating on the Albanian side of the Kosovo-Albanian border. 
? Interview with the Team Leader of HALO Trust operating in Gorance. 
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? Interviews with affected persons in Krivenik and Leskovica. 
? Interview / e-mail exchange with KFOR EOD. 
 
A one day field visit was conducted to areas in MNB East that were identified as 
areas of interest for discussion or as problematic cases. These were:  
 
? Kamena Glava (TD E 25-56) 
? Leskovica (TD E 7-41) 
? Gorance (DA 164) 
? Dimce 
? Krivenik (TD E 7-49) 
? Globocica (DA 4340) 
? Jezerc (TD E 25-58) 
 
The assessment team specifically addressed concerns raised by HALO Trust during 
the assessment, which proposed that there is an unkown and perhaps larger scale 
problem than expected. The concerns and the subsequent actions of the 
assessment team are detailed in chapter 7. 
 
The assessment team understands that the measures taken do not equal a 
complete re-survey of Kosovo, but believes that the available information has been 
thoroughly analysed in order to determine whether or not a complete re-survey is 
necessary.  The evidence reviewed also enabled an assessment of the  statements of 
the MACC at the end of  2001,  the operational situation assessments of OKPCC,  
and the conclusions of the UNMAS report of May 2006. 
 
6. Review and Analyses of Task Dossiers 
 
A total of 90 Task Dossier covering 156 Dangerous Areas were reviewed by the 
assessment team. 74 Task Dossiers covering 127 Dangerous Areas have been 
proposed by HALO Trust. Another 29 Dangerous Areas or Minefields, included in 16 
Task Dossiers, were chosen through coincidental sampling. It was agreed by all 
parties to the assessment that the amount of samples was sufficient to get a picture 
of the overall situation. However, the sample can not be considered representative, 
because it focussed on those Dangerous Areas which were identified as most likely 
to be problematic. As requested, special focus had been given to CBU strike areas: 
Out of the 156 DAs, 89 were CBU strike areas, 64 minefields, 2 EOD tasks and one 
house clearance.  
 
In the assessment tables, SN 1-45 were done by Vera Bohle, SN 46-100 and 134-
139 by Phil Bean, and SN 101-133 by David Elliot. With regard to IMSMA, Vera 
Bohle and David Elliot were supported by Luan Jaupi, Phil Bean by Ahmet Sallova. 
Dangerous Areas proposed for review by the HALO Trust included SN 1-34, 45, 51-
95 and 101-130, summing up to about 80% of the total DAs reviewed. 
 
6.a Completeness of Task Dossier documentation 
 
Table 1a only covers the information found in the Task Dossiers. The degree of their 
completeness varied. In this context it needed to be differentiated if “vital” 
information was missing, for example the information whether or not an area has 
been cleared, or just desirable information like a cover page was not available. 
Cases in which print outs from IMSMA were missing were also considered as minor 
problem as these could be duplicated. 
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The following key observations were made: 
 
o As an overall impression, the documentation was thorough, especially for a 
MACC that started its systems so soon after a war. 
o The “Ops Memos”, which are often referred to in IMSMA and which were a 
specific point of questioning for HALO Trust, appeared in various forms: As 
instruction from MACC operations to MACC IMSMA – either as a handwritten 
note or as detailed typed instructions; as MACC or NGO’s survey reports – 
with the quality ranging from post-it notes to detailed technical survey 
reports. In many cases Ops Memos by NGOs were presented as one-sentence 
discreditations, giving statements why a specific area had been considered 
safe after it had been visited. The terms verification and discreditation were 
used during survey to indicate if follow up action from a report of a 
suspected area was necessary, today in other programmes the word 
‘cancellation’ might be used for the same purpose as ‘discreditation’.  
o Many of the discreditation survey reports of 2000 and 2001 were not 
included in the Task Dossiers, but in extra files. They did not follow a 
specific order and it was thus time consuming to locate them. In IMSMA, 
these reports were often referred to as “Ops Memos” with the addition of the 
NGO that produced it. 
o The post-clearance survey reports of “Operation Normal Life” were also kept 
in extra files. In the given time frame, they could not be linked with the Task 
Dossiers and were thus seperately investigated. For this reason, the column 
“post clearance survey” has a no, even though these surveys have been 
conducted in many cases. 
o KFOR provided very few clearance reports, especially in the early days of 
clearance. 
 
It needs to be noted that the following Task Dossiers, which HALO Trust had 
proposed for review, could not be located: 
 
 Task Dossier 
1 S 24-14 
2 W 11-05 
3 W 17-18 
4 C 18-66 
5 W 02-54 
6 N 11-05 
7 N 27-07 
8 W 17-05 
9 W 08-12 
10 S 20-30 
11 W 02-28 
12 C 22-10 
13 W 02-37 
 
The findings propose that a continued thorough review of the Task Dossiers is  
conducted by the OKPCC EOD staff, in order to ensure their completeness. The 
missing Task Dossiers should be located and the separately filed survey 
discreditation reports should be added to the Task Dossiers. It could be considered 
if and how Operation “Normal Life” files and information could be added or 
annotated to the Task Dossiers. 
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Due to time constraints, the assessment team could not search for all of the 
required discreditation reports. However, this information is important to assess the 
necessity for a follow-up. For this reason, these Task Dossiers are listed below 
under “Follow-up Action” as “Document Research”. 
 
All of the other documentation can be progressively and systematically completed 
and checked as part of the ongoing management activity. 
 
 
6.b Analyses of Action on Dangerous Areas  
 
Out of 156 Dangerous Areas analysed, questions or problems indicated in Annex B 
occurred for 32 Dangerous Areas, (30 from areas identified as potentially 
problematic and 2 from the coincidental sampling). This figure can be subdivided as 
follows: 
 
? Missing Documents: 14 DAs, (contained in 13 Task Dossiers)   
? Follow-up OKPCC survey required: 6 DAs (in 3 areas) 
? Discrepancies between Task Dossiers and IMSMA: 12 DAs 
 
The detailed explanations follow. 
 
Follow-up Document Research 
 
 SN TD/DA 
1 31 S 20-32 / 900 
2 33 S 24-31 / 4237 
3 34 E 07-39 / 1662 
4 51 W 01-13 / 3912 
5 72 E 25-19 / 1333 
6 101 S 05-25 / 2959 
7 105 W 02-66 /2640, 2639 
8 125 W 01-43 / 3277 
9 126 W 01-43 / 3225 
10 127 W 01-43 / 3242 
11 128 W 01-43 / 1818 
12 130 N 21 – 07 / 517 
13 131 W 08 – 04 / 74 
 
These Task Dossiers were mostly missing discreditation reports, which were in a 
different file. Due to time constraints during the assessment, these discreditation 
reports could not be checked, but they could have been important to assess the 
measures taken to declare an area as cleared or discredited. The proposed follow-up 
for OKPCC is to search the missing documents, add them to the Task Dossier and 
analyse them with the help of table 2. 
 
It needs to be noted that in cases where the discreditation report had been found 
during the assessment, the action taken proved to be understandable and no 
follow-up was required. Sampling of the files containing discreditation reports led to 
the same result.  
 
For this reason, it is unlikely that that the above mentioned Dangerous Areas 
uncover a large scale problem in the field. However they illustrated a need for 
improvement in document filing. 
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Areas for OKPCC survey / community liaison 
 
The following areas have been identified for re-survey or community liaison: 
 
 SN TD/DA Priority 
1 43 S 24 – 05 / 548 No 
2 45 E 07 – 41 / 284 et al  Yes 
3 117 E 07 – 49 / 187 et al Yes 
 
 
The amount of areas identified for (re-)survey through the Task Dossier review does 
not propose that there is a major problem, beyond the capacity of KPC. 
 
6.c Discrepancies between Task Dossiers and IMSMA 
 
The 12 DAs listed here from 10 Task Dossiers as having discrepancies with IMSMA 
only, include those DAs where the analyses of action in table 2 showed a “No” at 
some stage. The Dangerous Areas requiring minor adjustments in IMSMA will not 
be listed in detail, as they are indicated in the tables and they have been discussed 
with OKPCC EOD. They also have no significance for the results of this assessment 
with regard to follow-up areas. 
 
 SN TD/DA Remarks 
1 53 E25-58 / 1485 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
2 57 S20-18 / 2964 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
3 62 S20-23 / 3994 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
4 70 E25-56 / 4032 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
5 100 W02-27 / 2723 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has not been conducted 
6 102 S20-04 / 3847 No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
7 103 S20-05 / 2048 Small areas uncleared due to high metal 
contamination not accurately recorded in 
IMSMA yet. Link other DAs to Completion 
Report. 
8 104 C18-12 /  
2515,  
2516 
IMSMA status discredited, but area had 
been subsurface cleared. 
9 107 
108 
S24-02 /  
2322,  
2560 
107 and 108 same DA area. Unite DAs in 
one TD, link DAs in IMSMA. Small 
uncleared/unclearable area left? 
10 110 W2-49 
2337  
No indication in IMSMA that sub-surface 
clearance has been conducted 
 
EOD OKPCC used IMSMA version 2. Updates produced problems because of 
numerous customisations that had been applied. For this reason, the old version 
continued to be used, with some shortcomings like inflexibility for entering small 
scale uncleared areas of a larger cleared area.  
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The problematic cases identified are further viewed in the next chapter. 
 
6.d Analyses of Outstanding Tasks 
 
The list of current and future mine/CBU clearance tasks annexed to the UNMAS 
2006 assessment has been found accurate, it corresponded to the outstanding Task 
Dossiers examined. Out of the 37 identified tasks, 5 were completed in the 
meantime and 1 is allocated to KFOR because it is in the northern Serb populated  
area of Kosovo. 11 tasks have been ongoing at the time of the assessment visit, 1 is 
used as training area by KPC, 1 is worked on by the Serb army as it is in the far 
north of Kosovo, 1 is occupied by UNHCR, 1 is within a KFOR response area (see 
also table below for details). This leaves 16 outstanding recorded tasks for KPC out 
of this list, non of them being considered as a high priority. 
 
List of outstanding tasks as per UNMAS report, updated: 
 
 TD Status Priority of Future Tasks 
1 C 19-12 Ongoing  
2 C 19-34 Ongoing  
3 S 24-29 Completed  
4 E 07-09 Partly completed / Future Task Low 
5 DA 4342 Completed end August  
6 W 01-36 Ongoing  
7 W 01-46 Future Task Low 
8 W 01-48 Ongoing  
9 C 09-12 Partly completed Future Task Low 
10 C 09-13 Future Task Low 
11 C 13-18 Completed  
12 C 18-13 Future Task Low 
13 C 18-66 Ongoing  
14 C 18-68 Future Task Low 
15 C 19-29 KFOR  
16 C 19-35 UNHCR area  
17 C 22-11 Future Task Low 
18 N 11-05 Serb Army Task  
19 N 11-09 Future Task Low 
20 N 28-01 KFOR Task  
21 N 29-01 Future Task Low 
22 DA 4317 Future Task Low 
23 S 16-08 Ongoing  
24 S 20-12 Ongoing  
25 S 20-42 If required Future Task Low 
26 S 20-48 Ongoing  
27 DA 2538 Completed / EOD Response Low 
28 E 25-25 KPC Training Area  
29 W 01-10 Future Task Low 
30 W 01-47 Ongoing  
31 W 02-27 Completed  
32 W 02-32 Completed  
33 W 02-37 Future Task Low 
34 W 02-84 Ongoing  
35 W 02-86 Future Task Low 
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36 W 17-16 Ongoing  
37 W 17-22 If required Future Task Low 
 
Additionally, a low priority Future Task had been identified by OKPCC (C 18-64, DA 
1471).  
 
 
The review of the Task Dossiers identified the following additional areas: 
 SN TD / DA Type Surface 
cleared 
Priority Sub-
surface 
Remarks 
1 53 E25-58 / 148515 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
2 57 S20-18 / 2964 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
3 62 S20-23 / 3994 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
4 70 E25-56 / 403216 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
5 100 W02-27 / 2723 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
6 102 S 20-04 / 3847 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
7 110 W 02 – 49 (10 
DAs) 
CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
 
All of them are BAC tasks that have not been sub-surface cleared, and the IMSMA 
record needs to be changed from ‘Complete’ to ‘Future Task’.  
 
The tasks should then be added to the follow up future tasks list, but not for active 
follow up in terms of adding them to the current work plan. If anything they will 
need follow up survey action peridiocially to confirm they are still low priority and if 
the area is accessible. 
 
Searching IMSMA for tasks with the status “Future Tasks”, additional 6 areas were identified 
that were not yet listed: 
 DA IMSMA Status Remarks 
1 3943 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, MAT 
survey 2005 
2 2550 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, very 
low priority, no 
action now 
3 2756 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, low 
priority 
                                                 
15 Jezerc, visited during assessment field trip, confirmed low priority, despite the survey report proposing high 
priority. 
16 Kamena Glava, visited during assessment field trip, confirmed no change of landuse 
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4 4325 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, MAT 
survey 2003 
5 3880 Future Task Mines, HALO 
survey 2005, 
priority 
6 4308 Future Task 
EOD Response 
Mines, MAT survey 
2003 
 
From an assessment of the documentation, one out of the 6 could be considered as 
a priority. However, the findings did indicate shortcomings in operational 
procedures in OKPCC EOD which had not highlighted these DAs for further 
activity. Four of the tasks were reported after 2001. 
 
The total of outstanding tasks would be the 16 listed tasks plus the one additional 
task which came up recently, plus the six areas which were indicated as “Future 
Tasks” but not yet listed, of which at least one does not require attention at this 
stage. The seven tasks mentioned for eventual re-assessment could be added. This 
sums up to 30 future tasks for clearance, of which one could possibly be considered 
as priority, even though not as a high priority as defined by OKPCC, but relatively 
higher than the very low priority tasks.  
 
Tabular overview of outstanding tasks: 
 
Origin Number 
OKPCC / UNMAS list 16 
New DA 1 
Additional IMSMA Future Tasks 6 
Low priority sub-surface 7 
Total 30 
 
Additionally, some of the identified survey tasks (see Annex C) could become new 
clearance tasks. 
 
6.e Nomenclature used for the Status of Tasks 
 
The nomenclature used so far for the status of tasks has been the following: 
 
Status name Meaning 
Complete Task cleared 
Current Task Task on workplan of the same year 
Discredited Task cancelled by survey 
EOD Response Low priority outstanding clearance task, eg remote CBU 
strikes sub-surface clearance 
Low Priority KPC Low priority outstanding clearance task for KPC. Possibly 
hazardous area or a known dangerous area which has 
received an initial clearance and is usually located in a 
remote location. These areas are low threat areas in the 
respect of their socio-economic effect and can be eventually 
completed by the national capacity. These tasks usually 
require only limited short term clearance to be completed. 
Future Task Task for future clearance workplan 
KFOR Responsibility Within KFOR camp or 500 metres around it, or other areas 
KFOR claims responsibility for. Also for areas in northern 
Serbian community parts of Kosovo. 
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Outside Kosovo Task not in Kosovo territory 
Suspended Task where the clearance activity has been interrupted, eg 
for the winter break 
Survey Task Pending verification or discreditation 
 
As the terms “EOD Response”, “Low Priority KPC” and “Future Task” point in a very 
similar direction, it could be considered to summarize them all under the term 
“Future Task”. 
 
At present there is no specific category for areas that have been cleared, but within 
the areas small scale parts were not clearable for various reasons (for example 
under a collapsed building). There is also no category for areas with such low 
priority that they will not come up in a clearance work-plan, or are even unclearable 
due to their remoteness or inaccessibility. The OKPCC could consider if it would 
help their work to give these kind of tasks a separate category (for example, 
category 1 future tasks for the work plan, category 2 future tasks permanently 
suspended). 
 
In addition to the status, IMSMA provides a tick box called “confirmed clear”. 
OKPCC should clarify and define in which cases this box is ticked, and record this 
decision process in accordance with SWPs. 
 
For operational planning purposes in a sense of identifying future tasks, the status 
should be used as filter when searching IMSMA. 
 
7. Assessment of the residual Threat posed by Mines/UXO 
 
Mine Action Work 1999-2001 
 
The accreditation and quality assurance (QA) procedures, as described in the 
according MACC and later OKPCC guidelines can be considered as thorough and 
they have been used as an example for programmes in other countries. The 
approach until 2001 has been to trust the work of NGOs once they have completed 
the accreditation procedures and did not get bad QA rankings. When evidence of an 
unacceptable standard of work was identified, counter measures such as re-
training were taken. If no improvement was achieved, in worst case the 
accreditation was withdrawn from an NGO. 
 
Since 1999 a total of 4,520 Dangerous Areas had to be dealt with, including 620 
minefields, 1,300 CBU strikes and 2,600 suspected UXOs. In excess of 41 million 
sqm of land have been cleared since 1999. 
 
OMiK Division of Safety and Security 
 
The Division of Safety and Security of OmiK summarizes the situation in their 
report “Overview – UXO in Kosovo” of 2006 as follows: 
 
“Kosovo wide, the impact the UXO threat appears to have upon the 
population can best be described as minimal. It is not suggested that this is 
due to ignorance.” 
 
 
 
 22
OSCE 
 
OSCE is at present conducting a regional mines survey, the general results for Peja 
and Prizren were:17 
 
  “…the majority of UXOs in the area are hand grenades”  
“The EOD teams intervention in each case was quick and efficient.”  
“The population is in general aware about the danger presented by UXO and 
a good level of vigilance can be observed.”  
“There are no areas where the quantity of UXO found would led to the 
concern that a certain place can be considered specifically dangerous”. 
 
More specific: 
 
Peja: “CBU are supposedly still present in a remote area on the top of the 
mountains around the Monastery, but it is supposedly a non-accessible 
zone, and CBU presence is well known from the population.” 
Peja, a formerly affected area, says “There is no problem with remaining 
mines and/or UXOs.” 
Istog: “There is no known minefield in the municipality” 
Prizren: “The very small numbers of mines and small numbers of artillery 
ammunition are showing a low threat in the area”, no accidents were 
reported and “the daily life is not perturbed”.  
Albanian border area: “In spite of the massive illegal border crossing, cattle 
smuggling, wood cutting in the green border zone, no accidents involving 
UXOs were reported during the Joint Border Co-operation meetings by KPS, 
UNMIK, KFOR and Albanian Border Police representatives.” 
 
A roundtable meeting in Junik on 2 August 2006, which was co-chaired by HALO 
Trust, highlighted some perceived or real problems with mines in the villages Gjocaj 
and Jasicq. The information will be assembled in a petition, which will be approved 
by the Junik Municipal Assmbly. The OSCE report further explains: 
 
“Once this is accomplished, it will be delivered to Halo Trust who will be 
entrusted to submit it to the Coordinator of the KPC in Prishtina.”  
 
After receiving the request, KPC should re-visit the two villages mentioned to assess 
the situation. At the same time, KPC should rectify the impression that such 
requests should be directed to HALO and explain the Kosovo procedures to the 
villagers, to OSCE and to the Municipality.18 
 
A person from Milaj reported that he did not consider his ground as safe even 
though it had been cleared a few months ago. And an inhabitant of the village Irznic 
near Decane raised concerns. Community Liaison is required in both cases to 
discuss the status and confirm if confidence in land use can be justified. 
 
The situation in the East can be generally summarized as “no negative economic 
impact on farming or movement”. However, in remote forest areas, especially at the 
                                                 
17 Report received through Jens Modvig, OSCE on 4 August 2006, the survey is still ongoing. All quotes on 
OSCE findings come from either this e-mail or from follow-ups covering the other regions. 
18 Following the OSCE report, another message needs rectification: “Halo Trust is gathering data to assist the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the United Nations Mine Action Service 
(UNMAS) as they conduct an assessment of unexploded mines in Kosovo.” Halo has not been requested to 
gather data to assist our work, and we are not conducting a specific assessment of unexploded mines. Neither is 
UNMAS. 
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border with FYROM mines and UXOs are still suspected. The village Semaja should 
be (re-)visited.  
 
The Dulje pass area is known for random mining. However, even here the 
population only feels unsafe about some remote mountain areas above the villages 
Recak, Belince and Caralevo. The Dulje pass area has been extensively surveyed 
since 1999 and the identified DAs have been cleared. Exhaustive clearance of 
remote forest areas is not advisable or possible, therefore these areas do not need to 
be re-surveyed. They remain for EOD emergency call-out as and when requested.  
 
Two sites in the hills of Nerodime village and the area at Kalaja Fortress (Ferizaj 
Municipality) are considered potentially unsafe and should be visited by a KPC 
liaison officer.   
 
In the Prishtina region, the agriculture land is used and there is no limit to 
movement through mines or UXO. This also refers to Obiliq, Kosovo Polje, Podujevo 
and Glogovac. The people know where to report stray ammunition when it is 
encountered. Germija (a hill side wooded region) is a know DA, which is on the 
future task list for clearance. KFOR should be made aware of the fact that the Serb 
community in Lipljan has concerns about UXO. 
 
The northern areas, Mitrovica, Vushtrri, Skenderaj, Vzecan and Leposavic report no 
unsolved problems with mines or UXO. 
 
A summary of places proposed for KPC community liaison is listed in Annex C. 
 
A high level of MRE and awareness speaks out of the reports, as well as the 
knowledge where to report UXOs. However, in some cases there is confusion in 
understanding the EOD system: 
 
“KFOR LMT advised OmiK to contact the NGO “Mine Action Center” (MAC), 
stating that it has the most current and accurate data on the mine situation 
in Kosovo.” 
 
In these cases, more liaison is needed, as the military personnel have a high 
turnover rate, to ensure that knowledge of the reporting system and of the 
responsible organisations is maintained. 
 
 
Accident Statistics 
 
In addition to the OSCE reports, all of the accident statistics were investigated. Vera 
Bohle assessed all accidents from 2002 and 2003, and David Elliot covered 2004-
2005. The documentation has been found to be thorough, apart from two missing 
casualties in 2002, who were not recorded due to reporting problems in the 
Ministry of Health. The system is now well established and the statistics as listed in 
the UNMAS 2006 assessment are accurate. Data on victims is obtained through 
reports of the Public Health Institute, and also pro-actively through newspapers or 
police reports. The OKPCC Victim Assistance Officer is sure to cover at least 95% of 
all accidents. 
 
The documentation on each accident contained statements on how it happened. 
Most accidents occurred through “tampering”, a tragic but typical example is an 
accident involving 6 children in 2002. A four year old boy found abandoned 
ammunition in an empty house, where somebody must have placed it. He took it 
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out and played with it, while friends were watching him. Sadly, it will be difficult to 
prevent such accidents through the work KPC, KFOR or the international NGOs are 
conducting. The accident investigation reports enlightened that most people who 
had accidents, through tampering or other, had received MRE training and – if old 
enough to understand – were aware of the threat. The fact that the majority of 
casualties happened through tampering indicates that there is not a large scale 
problem with unknown mines or UXO.  
 
The documented follow-up activities for four of the accidents which were not caused 
by tampering on behalf of OKPCC EOD Operations was not been evident, although 
we were told follow up action happened. The documentation available for the 
accidents at Dulje pass showed that survey and clearance followed without delay. 
  
Operation Normal Life 
 
MACC, MRE organisations and KFOR visited 570 villages end 2001, in order to 
ensure the local communities are both aware of and satisfied with the clearance 
work that has been undertaken in their respective areas. Maps and information 
were provided, meetings organised and village representatives invited for discussion 
of their view of the situation. The results were summarized in the MACC Annual 
Report 2001: 
 
“In most instances there is little to discuss, because ground that was 
previously mined has been put back into productive use.”  
 
Of the 570 villages 12 had required some form of follow-up activity.  
 
“In some cases, the concern was caused by confusion regarding the actual 
area that had been cleared, which was quickly resolved. In other cases, 
villagers had subsequently discovered single items of unexploded ordnance, 
and once again EOD teams were able to quickly dispose of these items. 
Overall the Operation “Normal Life” reports have not yielded any unexpected 
or dramatic results to counter the belief that the work has been completed 
satisfactorily across Kosovo.” 19 
 
Operation Normal Life was continued in 2002: any suspect area that had 
highlighted were technically surveyed by MAT, any areas that contained any UXO or 
mines were added to the current task list, which has been continually worked on 
since 2001.20  
 
Mine Action Stakeholders 
 
OKPCC explained their identification of high priority tasks as sites where accidents 
occurred, socio-economic development is hindered, and the mines/UXO have a 
direct negative impact of people’s everyday’s lives. The tasks KPC and the 
international NGOs currently work on, and the future tasks identified, were said 
not to have a ‘high priority’, but to be distant and of low impact. They are mostly in 
remote non-agricultural areas, some of them even on wooded hilltops. During the 
field visit of the assessment team, no high priority areas have been identified. 
 
                                                 
19 MAC 2001 Report 
20 E-mail information from Steve Saunders 10.8.2006 
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KFOR21 reacts on EOD call-outs. The majority of items they find are handgrenades, 
or other munitions stockpiled in houses. KFOR EOD teams conduct clearance in 
the northern Serbian populated areas of Kosovo, as KPC would have a problem to 
work there. They have not reported large scale problems for these parts. In general 
they perceive a low threat. KFOR confirmed they will clear within the 500 metres 
area of responsibility around their compounds, and continue with their MRE 
activities. 
 
MAT, having worked in Kosovo for three years conducting surveys and clearance, as 
well as supervising KPC, followed the assessment process and came to the 
conclusion that there are shortcomings in document and data management, but 
not a large scale unknown threat out in the field. 
 
HALO Trust had identified a number of points of concern, which received specific 
attention by the assessment team. The concerns, the subsequent actions of the 
assessment team and the results achieved are: 
 
? Concern: The large discrepancy between mines laid according to the VJ 
records and mines found during clearance or survey operations.  
? Action: Careful investigation of explanations in Task Dossiers about 
discredited mines. 
? Result: The explanations about discredited mines were credible.  
 
? Concern: That minefields with sub-surface mines were discredited through 
visual survey only.  
? Action: As above, with specific focus on minefields that were discredited 
through survey. 
? Result: None of the Task Dossiers / DAs reviewed indicated that sub 
surface minefields were discredited through visual survey only, however 
the remaining Task Dossiers should also be reviewed to complete this 
assessment.   
 
? Concern: The tasks flagging up in IMSMA as cleared by “Ops Memo”. The 
suspicion was raised that MACC operations, eager to complete the 
programme end 2001, closed sites without proper investigation or even from 
a desk assessment only. This suspicion was aggravated by the fact that the 
“Ops Memos” were not accessible to demining organisations. 
? Action: Careful investigation of “Ops Memos”. 
? Result: Most Ops Memos were located, their nature has been discovered. 
No Ops Memo supported the fact that tasks were closed prematurely or 
from the desk. Ops memos came in various forms, none had been 
removed to New York archives as had been suggested. 
 
? Concern: Discrepancies identified in IMSMA. A list had been provided in the 
initial briefing. 
? Action: All available Task Dossiers proposed by HALO Trust were 
investigated and compared with IMSMA. 
? Result: The results are detailed in this report. The list initially brought up 
by HALO Trust was considered as dealt with and as “history” by the 
HALO Trust Desk Officer after the assessment. The investigation process  
helped to identify some shortfalls in data management and 
communication which OKPCC will need to rectify. 
                                                 
21 Information on behalf of KFOR received through LTC Alberto Bozzano, SO JENGR OPS 
PLANS/JOC/MINES in KFOR headquarters Prishtina 
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? Concern: The MACC message at the end of 2001 that the last mine was 
cleared, whereas since then more mines and new Dangerous Areas have 
been found. An example list of 7 tasks where HALO Trust found mines/UXO 
had been provided in the initial briefing (see table below). 
? Action: Investigated the legitimacy of the messages passed by the MACC at 
the end of 2001. Assessed the 7 tasks from the HALO Trust list, plus two 
extra tasks that came up during the assessment (Krivenik and Dimce). 
? Result: The messages passed by the MACC end 2001, as detailed in the 
background chapter, have been legitimate. The tasks from the HALO list 
(see below, plus Krivenik and Dimce) assessed or visited did not give 
reason to change this conclusion (see also below). The  written statements 
provided at the end of 2001 were clear, but have since been 
misrepresented by a number of organisations. 
 
? Concern: A HALO Trust team leader had knowledge of uncleared minefields. 
Action: Interview with the Team Leader, field visit. 
? Result: The team leader seemed to have good knowledge of uncleared 
minefields since 1999. During the field visit, he indicated that he knows 
of two more remote minefields. Questions remained open why the 
minefields had not been formally reported by the Team Leader to OKPCC 
yet. The two suspected minefields known to the team leader should be 
reported for follow up action.  
 
? Concern: The local population keeps telling HALO Trust that they have a 
problem with mines/UXO. 
? Action: Assessment of the communication lines available for the local 
population to report Dangerous Areas to the OKPCC. Assessment of 
OSCE regional survey reports, UN security report and KFOR EOD 
response statistics. Investigation of accidents. Interviews with affected 
persons in two places. 
? Result: Communication lines for emergency EOD call-out seem to work 
well, but perhaps there are problems with reporting of DAs through 
Municipalities. Follow-up and pro-activity for OKPCC is recommended to 
ensure the process is understood and followed at a municipality level. 
Care should be taken that the right local procedures are communicated. 
From the OSCE reports, no large scale unknown problem areas for re-
visit have been extracted. UN security organisations see no problem, (see 
above). KFOR EOD response indicates no problem with larger scale areas, 
the procedural discussion with the EOD Management Cell. same can be 
deduced from accident statistics. Interviews with affected people showed a 
need for better community liaison. 
 
? Concern:  Some of the work done by demining agencies, and the follow-up of 
the MACC from 1999 until 2001 leaves questions open regarding 
completeness and reliability. 
? Action: Investigation of accreditation and quality assurance procedures 
1999-2001 through 
? Result: The accreditation and quality assurance procedures 1999-2001 
were generally thorough (and as a process have provided an example for 
programmes in other countries such as Lebanon and North Iraq). Even so 
in a few cases problems had occurred, mines or UXO had been found in 
areas recorded as clear or discredited,  and remedial clearance work was 
needed to complete a task. In these few cases the process for remedial 
action was carried out well. The risk of this happening in the future 
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should be recognised within  the planning of residual EOD capacity but 
the risk, based on current evidence,  should be regarded as low.  
   
? Concern: HALO Trust want to know what the mine/UXO situation is in 
Kosovo before they decide whether to close their programme. For this reason, 
they planned a survey between now and end 2006. A presentation of that 
survey has been provided in the initial briefing. 
? Action: Assess the knowledge of OKPCC about the mine/UXO situation in 
Kosovo. Consider the need for the proposed survey after investigating the 
results of the assessment. 
? Result: No evidence could be found that the knowledge of the OKPCC about 
the mine/UXO situation in Kosovo is not good. Indeed the depth of 
knowledge within the EOD Management Cell staff was impressive and it 
was clear that their personal experience throughout the province and the 
life of the programme was encyclopaedic. The results of the assessment 
do not lead to a requirement of the proposed re-survey. The assessment 
did conclude that the systems for community reporting should be 
proactively assessed and confirmed.  The ongoing surveys needs are 
within the capacity of KPC, this is part of the ongoing operational system 
and does not need to be a one off activity as was the case for Operation 
Normal Life back in 2001.  
 
Concern: List of HALO as presented in 1st meeting:   
 
Task Name OKPCC 
Classification 
Landuse HALO Method 
of Clearance 
Landmines and / 
or Cluster 
Munitions 
Destroyed 
Globocica Never Recorded 
as a DA 
Transit, grazing, 
wood cutting – 50 
beneficiaries per day 
Mineclearance  
37 
Goden Never Recorded 
as a DA 
Summer habitation, 
transit and 
livelihood – 30 
beneficiaries per day 
Mineclearance  
254 
Leskovica Declared as 
Cleared 
Habitation, grazing, 
and transit – 50 
beneficiaries per day 
Mineclearance  
32 
Gorance Discredited, 
through Survey, 
in 2001 
Cattle Grazing and 
transit – 20 
beneficiaries per day 
Mineclearance 
(current) 
 
33 
Ladrovc Declared as 
Cleared in 2001 
Transit, habitation, 
livelihood – Village 
within 500m – 
1,000 inhabitants 
Battle Area 
Clearance 
 
25 
Qubrel EOD Response School and 
proximity – 200 
beneficiaries per day 
Battle Area 
Clearance 
 
26 
Malisevo Never Recorded 
as a DA 
Transit, habitation, 
livelihood – Village 
within 500m – 
1,000 inhabitants 
Battle Area 
Clearance 
 
21 
 
 
Action: Desk assessment, field visit, interviews. 
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Results: 
  
Globocica, Gorance reported by HALO Team Leader who knew the sites since 1999. 
Why they had not been reported earlier was unknown. However, once reported  
there had been a very short time between reporting and start of clearance – no 
problem in system. 
 
Goden: Remote area on Albanian border, minefield discovered through DCA working 
on the Albanian side of the border. HALO Trust tasked with clearance. No problem 
in system.  
 
Leskovica: The clearance agency’s clearance in 2000 seemed to have stopped at a 
point where the minefield went on. Locals found PMA 2s, HALO Trust was tasked 
with clearance, 32 more mines were found during that clearance. Follow-up is 
necessary (listed above, TD E 07 – 41), because locals still fear mines in another 
area. According to them, the clearance agency that had cleared the area had told 
them in 2001 that it was still dangerous. Identified problem. 
 
Gorance: Discredited through survey in 2001 was another VJ minefield which 
contained two PMR 2A stakemines. The minefield where HALO Trust is working is a 
new DA, but had been known to the Team Leader since 1999. Short time between 
reporting and start of clearance – no problem in system. Low priority remote 
wooded area. 
 
Ladrovc is said to be geographically close to the same area as Malisevo.  The status 
in IMSMA has been “Low Priority / KPC”, which does actually not mean it is 
cleared. Perhaps the “confirmed clear” box had been ticked – for this problem see 
the chapter on Nomenclature. According to OKPCC, in July 2004 KFOR were called 
to the area and destroyed three bomblets that had been located by the farmers. In 
May 2005 HALO Trust conducted a survey of the area at the request of the land 
owners and located three more bomblets. After this, the area was entered as a new 
DA. The clearance was completed in 2005. Conclusion: The original clearance was 
incomplete, but the EOD reporting system worked. 
 
Qubrel, status “EOD Response”. The task has been known to OKPCC as “Low 
Priority” task. Halo had requested to do the clearance. This does not indicate a 
problem in the system, however perhaps the priority could have been higher. 
 
Malisevo: see above, Ladrovc.  
 
8. Assessment of the EOD Capacity 
 
OKPCC 
 
The OKPCC is staffed with local personnel mostly working for the programme since 
1999. Through this personnel continuity and through continuous comprehensive 
capacity building, a good knowledge of the situation in Kosovo, as well as of mine 
action coordination and management procedures, could be achieved and 
maintained. The officers have conducted travelled and surveyed throughout Kosovo, 
and their knowledge of the situation on the ground exceeds the documentation in 
the Task Dossiers or the IMSMA data base. 
 
The outstanding tasks are known to the relevant OKPCC staff not just from paper, 
but from personnel visits. For this reason, once a new task is allocated to a 
clearance agency, as well as issuing a written tasking order, the OKPCC operation 
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officer accompanies them to the new site for a direct briefing. This ensures proper 
execution from the outset. The initial briefing is followed by weekly QA visits. 
 
The OKPCC EOD cell has built up a good work relationship with KPC, KFOR, MAT, 
OSCE, other agencies operating in Kosovo, and the local authorities. They appeared 
to be well accepted in their role. 
 
The personnel of OKPCC EOD consisted at the time of the assessment visit of one 
operations manager, one quality assurance officer, one victim assistance officer and 
one mine risk education officer. The last international manager left in June this 
year. Mika Toivonen of MAT, who has five years experience in Kosovo and is fluent 
in Kosovo-Albanian language, is hired for one day per week to support the OKPCC 
EOD cell.  
 
With a minimum of staff, the OKPCC is fulfilling its role. However, the workload 
might be better shared if an office manager and perhaps an additional community 
liaison person could be employed on a temporary basis, especially in the peak times 
of operations, to address the problems encountered with documentation and data 
management and to allow more pro-active assessment of any concerns raised by 
communities or individuals. 
 
The high level of local knowledge within OKPCC EOD and its sustainability is 
invaluable for priority setting, community liaison and survey. Any ongoing or 
further survey work has to build on this knowledge, and be conducted as part of 
the coordinated, managed and progressive activity of the EOD Management Cell 
rather than a specific ‘one off’ survey project.  
 
KPC 
 
KPC has 94 trained EOD/demining staff, with 59 deminers, and the rest being team 
leaders and medical staff. They are subdivided in seven teams, each operating in 
their region. All teams have been trained in manual demining, battle area clearance, 
explosive ordnance disposal (up to 100 mm Land Service Ammunition), and house 
clearance. By end 2005 each team had a community liaison officer. The team 
leaders and medical staff are trained to “train the trainer”, to train EOD and first 
aid. By the end of this year five of seven teams will be trained in technical survey.  
 
MAT have four training instructors working with KPC, and additionally two survey 
teams of their own operating Kosovo-wide. With the latter teams, MAT concentrates 
on areas where KPC has difficulties to work, for example remote hilltops that 
require overnight stays and camping equipment.. The two ten man teams are 
funded from August 2006 until November 2007 specifically to enhance and support 
the verification of all remaining suspect areas and then hand them over to KPC.     
 
In 2007, the KPC clearance capacity will be expanded by 24 more staff to allow 
senior personnel to progress in order to take on the EOD response role of KFOR, 
who are in a process of reducing their capacity. With the new team members, the 
transfer of KFOR responsibility should be possible to be handled, but the training of 
senior EOD personnel is still required. This concept would be in accordance with 
the principle of building national structures. For the 24 new recruits, it would be 
good if KPC would take on already experienced deminers from the agencies like the 
HALO Trust who will be closing down by the end of this year. 
 
The KPC clearance rates had been low in the early days for various reasons, such 
as ongoing training, limited work hours, unwillingness to stay overnight in 
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operational theatres, or influence taking of local commanders. KPC clearance rates 
seem to have improved to an acceptable level now through progressive training and 
management. However, it is difficult to assess clearance statistics, because the 
ground conditions are not known.  
 
Detailed operational planning in a sense of time per task is equally difficult when 
sites are cleared following the “inside-out” principle. For this reason, it is difficult to 
predict how much time KPC will require for the outstanding tasks. However, as 
none of the tasks has a direct negative impact on the local population, they can be 
cleared progressively without time pressure. 
 
Shortcomings have been encountered with regard to equipment repair facilities, 
especially for detectors and locators, a point that should be addressed for future 
planning. Furthermore, KPC has no equipment to work in remote areas where 
camping is required. Also their current working hours would not enable such work. 
For this reason, the support MAT is providing in this matter is helpful. But for the 
future, solutions need to be found for these cases.  
 
KFOR 
 
The KFOR EOD capacity is considered a NATO secret, for this reason no details 
were provided. The nations involved include Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, USA. The teams 
are on permanent stand-by, ready to intervene at short notice. No problems were 
encountered with regard to KFOR EOD response. KFOR is planning to downsize, 
the details of this were also considered secret. It can be hoped that the downsizing 
happens in a dialogue with OKPCC to enable proper planning. As the 
communications have proved to be good, this can be assumed. The increase of KPC 
should compensate the downsizing of KFOR. As hardly any new priority DAs come 
up for clearance, there should not be a resource problem. 
 
KFOR/NATO contracted the commercial company Armour Group to clear 35,000 
square metres at Prishtina airport prior to a construction activity. No mines, UXO 
or abandoned ammunition were found. However, the contract illustrated that larger 
scale clearance needs can be addressed in this way, (i.e. by commercial contract) 
which is certainly appropriate in financial terms. The agency requesting work 
should in such cases also pay for the clearance, not the international donor 
community. 
 
Communication lines for Reporting of UXO / DAs 
 
When an explosive item is found by the local population, an emergency request can 
be sent to the police, KFOR or KPC. The requests are forwarded to either OKPCC or 
KFOR, who would then send out an EOD team. So far in 2006 there were 838 of 
these requests. This figure, as well as the interviews conducted with KFOR, indicate 
that there is no problem with the reporting of explosive devices or emergency 
response. The figures do illustrate the relatively high numbers of munitions in 
circulation.  
 
The reporting process for an ‘area’ that an individual believes is dangerous or 
suspicious, is more structured. The person has to approach the Municipality to 
write to the Office of Emergency Response, who in turn write to OKPCC. Once the 
request has come to OKPCC, they assess the information against their records, they 
look for coordinate or location identifiers, a point of contact to liaise with and then 
initiate a KPC visit. In 2004, twelve of such reports reached OKPCC, in 2005 there 
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were five and in 2006 so far two. This may be an indication that there is no problem 
with DAs, which would also be supported by the accidents statistics, but it might 
also indicate that there is a problem in the reporting process. This aspect should be 
followed up by OKPCC. 
 
Once a DA is reported to OKPCC, it is dealt with in due time. For example the 
clearance tasks in Goden, Gorance or Leskovica have been completed or will be by 
the end of August. 
 
The communication lines between KFOR and OKKPC were established, the details 
of their quality could not be assessed due to time constraints. 
 
As part of the ongoing MRE campaign, the local television sends MRE messages on 
a daily bases. The clips inform the population about what measures should be 
taken if a suspicious item is found. 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
Mines/UXO generally do not impede movement or socio-economic development in 
Kosovo. This does not ignore the fact that in some rural areas the perceived or real 
threat of mines/UXO may affect the population. However, accident statistics 
indicate that the real threat is minor, and that the population is well aware of it 
through mine risk education. This means there is no emergency situation requiring 
quick action, but progressive improvement is possible. 
 
The outstanding clearance time projection is difficult – but guided by priority and 
resources, no artificially imposed deadline is necessary. Priorities should be met, 
resources should be utilised to their best potential, but the end of 2006 is not a 
deadline for completion.  
 
The OKPCC historic file processing and priority classification is clear in the majority 
of cases, the clearance or cancellation documentation and measures taken are 
appropriate for majority of the Task Dossiers examined. The task status has been 
found appropriate for most cases. The information is sufficient for a demining 
agency to conduct the task. The classification of areas as cleared, cancelled or as 
KPC tasks is generally clear and understandable.  
 
The amount of areas identified for (re-)survey through the Task Dossier review and 
the other measures would appear to be within the projected capacity of KPC and 
KFOR. As most areas are low priority, there is open capacity to adjust work plans 
for incoming new DAs that might have a higher priority. 
 
The review of the Task Dossiers has not been exhaustive and focussed on the 
known problematic areas. However, the amount of Task Dossiers viewed allows 
conclusions to be drawn. The Task Dossier review should be continued by OKPCC 
EOD with the methodology applied so far to precisely assess the situation. Some 
shortcomings in OKPCC EOD filing and data management have been identified, and 
recommendations for remedial action have been provided.  
 
The concerns raised by the demining organisation were investigated. The discussion 
around missing “Ops Memos” resulted in the realization that they have not been 
produced by the MACC Chief of Operations at his desk in a rush to close the 
programme in 2001, as suggested during the initial briefings. 
 
 32
As the known DAs lay in the capacity of KPC, any follow-up survey needs to build 
on the work done in previous years, and on the experience gained. It should be 
considered as a continuous process conducted by the local capacity. The planned 
gradual reduction of KFOR EOD should be compensated through the increase of 
KPC in 2007.  
 
Considering 4,520 Dangerous Areas dealt with from 1999, and the number of 
agencies and organisations involved with EOD activity, then a small proportion of 
discrepancies, whilst unfortunate, seems feasible. This is not enough to undermine 
the credibility of the work done by accredited and QA’d NGOs.  
 
From this independent review the assessment team supports the key findings of the UNMAS 
Kosovo assessment report 2006, in that the planned KPC capacity is sufficient for residual 
EOD requirements.22  
Furthermore the assessment team conclude that the general and actual situation 
assessment made by the UN in 2001 does not need to be changed or rectified. 
 
Some of the findings of the assessment would not have been visible without the 
‘questions’ raised by the HALO Trust. With hindsight it would have been better and 
more productive if the communications and trust between HALO and the OKPCC 
would have allowed them to solve the problems internally and progressively. 
External programme monitoring, i.e. from outside of Kosovo might have assisted in 
earlier recognition of this communication problem and reached a more timely 
solution.     
 
10. Lessons Learned 
 
General lessons learned in Kosovo that can be applied to programmes of a similar 
nature in other countries include the following: 
 
? The need for progressive data management, including regular review of files 
and a quality assurance process for data entry, is recommended. This is 
particularly relevant for UN programmes that are completing and closing 
down, in order to hand over easily accessible data. IMSMA Version 4 is 
designed to help in this regard. 
? The production of IMAS for Cluster Strike Clearance and Data Management 
could be considered. 
? The need for Mine Action Programmes to maintain an auditable record of 
decisions and why they were made. 
? That programmes should be supported by an external monitoring and 
evaluation component. 
 
 
Annex A  Terms of Reference for Assessment 
Annex B Evaluation Assessment Tables 
Annex C List of DAs to be (re-)visited by KPC 
 
                                                 
22 Report on the Landmine and Cluster Bomb Threat in 2006. Situation Analyses and Evaluation of the Kosovo 
Protection Corps Capacity to address the Problem, UNMAS, 14 May 2006 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
BAC   Battle Area Clearance 
CBU   Cluster Bomb Unit 
DA   Dangerous Area 
DCA   Danish Church Aid (NGO) 
EOD   Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
FYROM  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
GICHD  Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining 
HALO   The Halo Trust (NGO) 
IMAS   International Mine Action Standards 
IMSMA  International Management System for Mine Action 
KFOR   Kosovo Force 
KPC   Kosovo Protection Corps 
MACC   Mine Action Co-ordination Center 
MAP                       Mine Action Programme 
MAT   Mines Advisory Trust (NGO) 
MNB   Multi-National Brigade (sector) 
MRE   Mine Risk Education 
NGO   Non-governmental Organisation 
OKPCC  Office of the Kosovo Protection Corps Coordinator 
OmiK   OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
OSCE   Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
PISG   Provisional Institutions of Government 
QA   Quality Assurance 
SWP   Standard Work Procedures 
TD   Task Dossier 
UNMAS  United Nations Mine Action Service 
UNMIK  United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
UXO   Unexploded Ordnance 
VJ   Serb Army 
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Annex A: Terms of Reference 
 
TERMS OF REFERENCE 
FOR AN ASSESSMENT INTO OPERATIONAL 
MINE/UXO CLEARANCE ACTIVITIES IN KOSOVO 
 
 
Situation Overview/Background 
 
Following the hostilities in Kosovo and subsequent NATO-led bombing campaign in 
1999, the province was contaminated with mines laid primarily by Serbian military 
forces, and unexploded cluster bomb sub-munitions (CBU) dropped by coalition air 
forces.  Under the auspices of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), which 
was mandated by Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 to act as the 
interim administrative authority in Kosovo until such time as its final status could 
be determined, a Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC) was established to 
oversee all mine action activities in the Province.  
 
As part of the coordination function, the MACC collected and collated all available 
information on mine and unexploded ordnance contamination within the 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The information loaded 
into the system included NATO bombing data; Serbian military minefield records; 
reports provided by the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission; survey reports from 
mine action NGOs, including those submitted by HALO Trust which was funded by 
UK DFID to undertake a rapid survey of contaminated areas; NATO Kosovo Force 
(KFOR) reports; and miscellaneous information provided by humanitarian agencies 
and members of the public. At one point, IMSMA contained some 4,000 reported 
“Dangerous Areas” (DAs), and although many were either known or suspected to be 
duplicate or erroneous reports, the MACC made a conscious decision to include all 
information until the accuracy of each report could be verified.  
 
From June 1999 - December 2001 the MACC coordinated survey, clearance and mine risk 
education (MRE) activities within the Province. This included a systematic survey/evaluation 
of all DAs recorded in IMSMA. Those DA that were confirmed as containing a hazard 
required some form of clearance activity. Those DA that were not considered to contain a 
hazard required a certified explanation as to why this was the case. In both situations, 
appropriate reports were required to be submitted before an area was declared cleared or 
cancelled.  
 
During clearance operations from 1999-2001, the clearance of CBU affected areas was 
generally undertaken as a two-step process.  The first stage involved the initial clearance of 
items on, or just below the surface using instrument and visual search techniques.  This had 
the advantage of quickly removing the major, easily accessible threat that was responsible for 
the vast majority of CBU accidents, as well as better defining the actual contaminated area.  
This meant that the second step, which was sub-surface clearance down to 50cm could be 
completed more efficiently.  Where it was ascertained that the land would be used for 
agriculture or building purposes, sub-surface clearance was undertaken from the outset. 
 
 
In December 2001, the responsibilities undertaken by the MACC were passed to a number of 
different government departments that were established under the Joint Interim 
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Administrative Structure (JIAS), pending a political settlement in Kosovo. The responsibility 
for ongoing mine and UXO clearance was transferred to the Department for Civil Security 
and Emergency Preparedness (DCSEP). DCSEP was responsible for the management and 
oversight of the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), which had been assigned responsibility for 
assisting in demining under UNMIK Regulation 1999/8. The DCSEP subsequently became 
the UNMIK Directorate of Civil Protection (UNMIK DCP) in January 2002, and later it 
became the UNMIK Office of the KPC Coordinator (OKPCC).  
 
The OKPCC includes the UNMIK EOD Management Section, which is tasked to: act as the 
focal point for all mine and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) clearance in Kosovo; plan, 
coordinate and monitor all mine and UXO activities in Kosovo; conduct Quality Assurance 
and Quality Control checks in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS); 
train and develop the KPC operational capacity; and liaise with all organizations operating in 
Kosovo.   
 
As part of the transfer of responsibility for operational clearance to the KPC, a number of 
remaining DAs were left for the KPC to complete. These DAs were primarily located in an 
area known as the Dulje pass.  There were also a number of CBU-affected areas that had not 
yet been sub-surface cleared and were considered low priority tasks that the KPC EOD teams 
could complete over a longer period of time.  These were designated “EOD Response”, in that 
it was expected that items could be discovered from time to time.  These items would be dealt 
with as they were discovered, and the areas would remain on a ‘watch-list” until such time as 
they were systematically cleared by the KPC teams. There are currently 42 tasks that are 
designated EOD response and are planned for systematic clearance in the future. 
 
The coordination of these clearance tasks is the responsibility of the EOD Management 
Section. As was the practice in 1999-2001, all tasks are held in “Task Dossiers”, which are a 
hard copy compilation of all available information on the particular DA concerned, including 
survey/clearance activities that have taken place to date on the site. There are currently 677 
archived task Dossiers held by the EOD Management Section.and 31 which remain open  
 
The IMSMA is a combination database/Geographic Information System (GIS) and can be 
used to graphically display the information contained in the Task Dossiers relating to each 
DA. It is essential that IMSMA accurately reflect the actual status of each cleared or 
remaining DA, in accordance with the information contained in the Task Dossiers. 
 
Purpose of the Assessment 
 
The OKPCC requires an assessment of all Task Dossiers held by the EOD Management 
Section, to ensure that appropriate action has been undertaken to either clear, cancel, or 
designate the task for future clearance by the KPC. This is because there have been some 
questions raised as to the extent of clearance work that remains in Kosovo, and a concern that 
it may be beyond the capability of the KPC EOD/Survey capacity. The purpose of this 
assessment is to determine the extent of work that remains in Kosovo, by auditing the work 
that has been completed to date. Particular emphasis will be given to identifying areas that 
have been surface cleared of CBU, but still require sub-surface clearance. 
  
Requirement 
 
The OKPCC requires the following activities to be undertaken: 
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a. Conduct a systematic review of the Task Dossiers held by the EOD Management 
Section to determine whether appropriate actions have been undertaken to declare DAs as 
being either cleared, cancelled, or to designate the DA as being a future clearance task by the 
KPC. Provide a detailed list of discrepancies as they are encountered and a recommended 
remedial action.  
 
b. Determine whether there is a requirement for the OKPCC to re-visit any DA to 
confirm its status, based on a lack of supporting information contained within the Task 
Dossier. Provide a list of DA to be re-visited. 
 
c. Compare the information contained within the Task Dossiers with the Information 
contained in IMSMA, identify any areas of discrepancy, and make recommendations for 
remedial action in each case.  
 
d. Determine the number of tasks that remain to be completed, either as a result of the 
DAs being designated as EOD Response Tasks, or by virtue of the fact that full clearance has 
not yet been completed and/or recorded. 
 
e. Assess the current nomenclature being applied to the status of tasks, and make 
recommendations for categorising the tasks in accordance with mine action sector standards. 
 
It is envisaged that most of this activity will take place within the OKPCC. However, one or 
more trips to the field for orientation purposes are considered to be necessary. The team 
should also be prepared to visit a number of the sites where any discrepancies are identified, 
in order to provide some analysis of the nature and impact of the situation. 
 
Duration and Team Composition 
 
It is expected that the assessment would be undertaken by a team of up to three people over a 
period of 10 days. At least one of the team should have experience in utilising IMSMA, 
although support for this does exist within the OKPCC and suitably qualified staff will be 
made available to assist as required. Knowledge of mine action operations, including survey 
and clearance activities will be essential. 
 
The staff of the OKPCC EOD Management Section will be on hand to provide support to the 
assessment activity as required by the team. 
 
Deliverable 
 
A report that meets the requirements listed above is to be provided to the OKPCC within four 
weeks of the completion of the assessment activity in Kosovo. 
 
Annex B: Assessment of selected Task Dossiers part 1a (descriptive) 
 
SN TD / DA 
No. 
Cover 
pages 
DA 
Report(s) 
Map, VJ, 
Photo, 
Sketch 
Tasking 
Order 
Suspension 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Survey(s) 
Discreditation 
Report(s) 
Post 
Clearance 
Survey 
Same DA as 
1 W02-67/ 
2377 
No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
2 W2-18/ 
2376 
No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
3 S20-29/ 
1148 
No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 
2441, 2332, 2333 
4 S20-30/ 
2332 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Ref DA 1148 No No 2333 
5 S16-13/ 
1521 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No Acc rep 169 
6 N28-1/ 
3894 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
7 N28-1/ 
2534 
No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 2529 
8 N28-1/  
1998 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 2816 
9 N28-1/  
2432 
No Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
10 N28-1/  
2435 
No Yes Yes No No No No No No  
11 W 2-23/ 
2783 
No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
12 W 2-23/ 
2784 
No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
13 W 2-23/ 
2785 
No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
14 W 2-23/ 
2786 
No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
15 W 2-29/ 
2595 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No  
16 C19-22/ 
3926 
No Yes Yes No Yes  Yes No No No 2726,  2621 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Cover 
pages 
DA 
Report(s) 
Map, VJ, 
Photo, 
Sketch 
Tasking 
Order 
Suspension 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Survey(s) 
Discreditation 
Report(s) 
Post 
Clearance 
Survey 
Same DA as 
17 W 2-76/ 
2350 
No Yes Yes No No No No Yes (Ops 
Memo) 
No  
18 W 2-59/ 
3951 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
19 W 2-59/ 
2336 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
20 W 2-59/ 
2343 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes (actually 
discred.) 
No No No  
21 W 2-59/ 
2601 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes (actually 
discred.) 
No No No  
22 W 2-59/ 
3953 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes (actually 
discred.) 
No No No  
23 W 2-14/ 
2646 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No  
24 W 2-14/ 
2647 
Yes Yes Yes No Ref 3917 Ref 3917 No No No  
25 W 2-14/ 
3917 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No  
26 C 9-11/ 
3002 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes (Ops 
Memo) 
No  
27 W 2-30/ 
3266 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes (for VJ MF) No  
28 C 19-28/ 
3884 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes (Ops 
Memos) 
No  
29 C 19-19/ 
3200 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes (Ops 
Memos) 
No  
30 N 28-2/ 
2420 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes (Ops 
Memo) 
No 2421, 2422, 2423, 2483, 
2484 
31 S 20-32/ 
900 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 3414, 3415, 1153, 1154, 
3413, 2752, 2753 in same 
TD 
32 S24-31/ 
4266 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Cover 
pages 
DA 
Report(s) 
Map, VJ, 
Photo, 
Sketch 
Tasking 
Order 
Suspension 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Survey(s) 
Discreditation 
Report(s) 
Post 
Clearance 
Survey 
Same DA as 
33 S24-31/ 
4237 
No No No No No No No No No Also valid for: 4249, 
4250, 4254, 4257, 4260 
34 E 7-39/ 
1662 
Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No 1620, 1597, (MF 281, MF 
293?) 
35 E 23-17/ 
1992 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 1747 
36 C 9-6/ 
1224 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
37 W 2-28 
2714 
No No No No No No No Ops Memo 
change of files 
No DA 2714 and 2723 moved 
to TD W 2-27, W 2-28 no 
longer exists 
38 E 25-3/ 
1486 
Yes Yes No No No No No Yes No  
39 C 3-15/ 
MF 490 
Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No  
40 C 3-15/ 
MF 491 
Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No  
41 C 3-15/ 
MF731 
Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No  
42 C 3-15/ 
3948 
Yes Yes No No No No No No No  
43 S 24-5/ 
548 
Yes Yes No No No No No No No  
44 N28-1/  
2433 
Yes Yes No No Yes No No No No  
45 E 7-41/ 
MF 284 
Yes Yes No No No Yes (2) No No No  
46 W02-27, 
3756 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
47 W02-27 
3738 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
48 E25-34 
2355 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No Duplicates of TD,E7-9, 
current task 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Cover 
pages 
DA 
Report(s) 
Map, VJ, 
Photo, 
Sketch 
Tasking 
Order 
Suspension 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Survey(s) 
Discreditation 
Report(s) 
Post 
Clearance 
Survey 
Same DA as 
49 E25-35 
2356 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No Duplicates of TD E7-9, 
current task 
50 N11-11 
4034 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Duplicate of TD N 11-10 
51 W1-13 
3912 
 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 3966,2789,2760, 
single CBU strike 
52 S24-06 
2559 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
53 E25-58 
1485 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 2348 
54 W2-78 
2413 
No Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
55 E10-1 
3860 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
56 W2-20 
104 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
57 S20-18 
2964 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 2060,2061,2062 
2063,2523,2524, 
2961,2962,2963 
 
58 W02-60 
3754 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 3257,3256 
59 S24-27 
3906 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No  
60 S20-35 
3275 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No 3274 
61 S20-21 
2548 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No 2545 
62 S20-23 
3994 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 3909 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Cover 
pages 
DA 
Report(s) 
Map, VJ, 
Photo, 
Sketch 
Tasking 
Order 
Suspension 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Survey(s) 
Discreditation 
Report(s) 
Post 
Clearance 
Survey 
Same DA as 
63 E25-47 
2331 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
64 W01-45 
4075 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No  
65 W17-10 
2445 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 2776,2775,2431, 
2770,2782 
66 C18-43 
2774 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 3600 
DAs 
2581,2586,2607,2743, 
2746,2747,2748,2758, 
2768,2771,2772,2773, 
2791,1357 passed to 
Serbia  
67 W17-5 
1871 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 2477,2497 
68 C13-15 
4028 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
69 C13-15 
2571 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No BACTEC Ops 
memo 14/3/00 
No 2570 
70 E25-56 
4032 
No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No  
71 W01-25 
2547 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 3962 
72 E25-19 
1333 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No  
73 E25_19 
3610 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Yes No  
74 W02-03 
1833 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
75 W02-58 
3556 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 4065,3988,3851 
76 W02-32 
2384 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Cover 
pages 
DA 
Report(s) 
Map, VJ, 
Photo, 
Sketch 
Tasking 
Order 
Suspension 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Survey(s) 
Discreditation 
Report(s) 
Post 
Clearance 
Survey 
Same DA as 
77 W02-52 
2562 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 4271 
78 C13-22 
2576 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Ops memo 
19/6/01 
No 3127 
79 C13-23 
2513 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Ops memo 
19/6/01 
No 1407 
80 C13-24c 
2021 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Ops memo 
19/6/01 
No 2328,2329,2984,2985 
2022,2326,2327,2985, 
2984,2329,2328,2021 
81 N21-2 
4071 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No 3872 
82 W01-29 
2557 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No  
83 E7-44 
3886 
Yes No No No No No No No No Duplicate of MF220 
84 E7-44 
3385 
Yes No No No No Yes No No No Duplicate of MF204 
1707,1795,1794 
1711. 
85 E7-44 
3384e 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Duplicate of MF204 
1617 
86 E7-44 
1705 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 3463,1708 
87 E7-44 
1713 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No Ops memo No  3722 
88 E7-44 
3689 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
89 E7-44 
1706 
Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No  
90 E7-46 
3378 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
91 E7-46 
3379e 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
92 E7-46 
3380 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Cover 
pages 
DA 
Report(s) 
Map, VJ, 
Photo, 
Sketch 
Tasking 
Order 
Suspension 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Survey(s) 
Discreditation 
Report(s) 
Post 
Clearance 
Survey 
Same DA as 
93 E7-40 
1674 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
94 E7-40 
1073 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
95 E7-40 
1673 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
96 S24-25 
2764 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 2765 
97 W02-27 
2396 
 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 2397 
98 W02-27 
2397 
See 2396          
99 W02-27 
2714 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
100 W02-27 
2723 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
101 S5-25 / 
2959 /  
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No 2960 / 3907 / 2058 / 2395 
/ 2394 / 2393 / 2059 
102 S20-04 / 
3847 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No  
103 S20-05 / 
2048 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No 2942 / 2047 / 2941 / 2050 
/ 2051 / 2944 / 2945 
104 C18-12 / 
2515 
2516 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
105 W2-66 / 
2640 / 
2639 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No  
106 S24-02 / 
2323 
Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No  
107 S24-02 / 
2322 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Cover 
pages 
DA 
Report(s) 
Map, VJ, 
Photo, 
Sketch 
Tasking 
Order 
Suspension 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Survey(s) 
Discreditation 
Report(s) 
Post 
Clearance 
Survey 
Same DA as 
108 S24-02 / 
2560 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No  
109 C13-17 / 
1993 / 
1995 /  
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No 1994 /1996 / 2501 / 2792 / 
2793 / 2794 / 2795 
110 W2-49 
2337 /  
No Yes Yes No Yes No No No No 2340 / 2341 / 2342 / 2596 
/ 2602 / 2603 / 2604 / 
2615 / 4033 
111 C09-07 / 
2635 / 
2636 
No Yes Yes No No No Yes No No  
112 C3-17 / 
2536 
Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No  
113 C3-17 /  
2387 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No  
114 C19-32 /  
2042 / 
3938 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No  
115 C09-09 / 
2034 / 
2899 / 
2900 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No  
116 N12-02 / 
2892 
No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No 2026 
117 E07-49 / 
187 / 188 / 
189 / 190 
No Yes No No No No No No No  
118 E07-49 / 
229 / 264 
No Yes No No No Yes No No No  
119 E07-49 / 
872 / 876 / 
3830 / 
4277 / 
4279 
No Yes No No No Yes No No No  
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Cover 
pages 
DA 
Report(s) 
Map, VJ, 
Photo, 
Sketch 
Tasking 
Order 
Suspension 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Survey(s) 
Discreditation 
Report(s) 
Post 
Clearance 
Survey 
Same DA as 
120 W1-44 / 
3228 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No 3231 / 3494 
121 Deleted by DE See SN 122         
122 E7-25 / 
221 / 222 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No E7-25 / 3384 / 3389 / 1681 
/ 1680 / 224 / 225 
123 W01-43 / 
418 / 434 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No  
124 W01-43 / 
436 / 431 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes No  
125 W01-43 / 
3277 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No  
126 W01-43 / 
3225 
Yes No No No No No No No No DA listed on cover page 
127 W01-43 / 
3248 
Yes No No No No No No No No  
128 W01-43 / 
1818 
Yes No No No No No No No No DA listed on cover page 
129 W08-03 / 
3819 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No  
130 N21-07 / 
517 (DA) 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No  
131 W08-04 / 
74 
Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No  
132 C13-05 Deleted by DE         
133 S05-10 / 
548 / 549 / 
551 
Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No  
134 E26-4 
2456 
Yes Yes Yes N/A No Yes No No  2457 
135 E26-15 
1694 
Yes Yes Yes N/A No Yes No No  MF154 
136 E26-15 
1693 
Yes Yes Yes N/A No  Yes No No  MF153 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Cover 
pages 
DA 
Report(s) 
Map, VJ, 
Photo, 
Sketch 
Tasking 
Order 
Suspension 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Report(s) 
Completion 
Survey(s) 
Discreditation 
Report(s) 
Post 
Clearance 
Survey 
Same DA as 
137 E26-15 
1695 
Yes Yes Yes N/A No Yes No No  MF 155 
138 E26-15 
1695 
Yes Yes Yes N/A No Yes No No  MF 156 
139 N21-16 
3667 
Yes Yes Yes N/A No Yes No No  MF 540 
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Annex B: Assessment of selected Task Dossiers part 1b (descriptive) 
 
S
N 
TD / DA 
No. 
Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action taken to 
clear or cancel? 
Nomenclature 
consistency 
How old is 
survey data?23
Discrepancies with 
IMSMA database 
Documentation complete (ref 
1a) 
1 W02-67/ 
2377 
CBU Strike EOD Response Manual Clearance Yes N/A Completion not yet entered DA 2380, 2787, 2788 missing as 
hard copy in TD 
2 W2-18/ 
2376 
CBU Strike Discredited Reconnaissance (survey) 
Ops Memo of 15/7/00 
Yes N/A No Yes 
3 S20-29/ 
1148 
CBU Strike No status given KFOR response (camp 
Prizren) 
Yes N/A No Yes 
4 S20-30/ 
2332 
CBU Strike KFOR 
Responsibility 
KFOR Response (camp 
Prizren) 
Yes N/A No Yes 
5 S16-13/ 
1521 
House 
Clearance 
Complete House Clearance and Re-
Survey 
Discreditation report is 
Mine/UXO Area 
Reconnaissance and 
Survey Report 
N/A TD says accident possibly 
CBU, -> IMSMA 
classifies CBU task 
Yes 
6 N28-1/ 
3894 
CBU Strike Discredited KFOR Survey Yes N/A No Yes 
7 N28-1/ 
2534 
CBU Strike Discredited KFOR and OKPCC 
Survey 
Yes N/A No discreditation report in 
TD, only in IMSMA 
Discreditation report missing 
8 N28-1/  
1998 
CBU Strike Low priority / KPC 
and ticked 
confirmed clear 
(2816) 
Survey Task 
KFOR Surface Clearance Yes N/A 1998 ticked as cleared Yes 
9 N28-1/  
2432 
CBU Strike Survey Task Sub-surface cleared Yes N/A IMSMA not reflecting 
completed clearance 
Yes 
10 N28-1/  
2435 
CBU Strike Survey Task outstanding Yes N/A No Yes 
11 W 2-23/ 
2783 
CBU Strike Discredited Reconnaissance (survey) 
Ops Memo of 15/7/00 
Yes N/A No Yes 
12 W 2-23/ 
2784 
CBU Strike Discredited Reconnaissance (survey) 
Ops Memo of 15/7/00 
Yes N/A No Yes 
                                                 
23 Only for current tasks 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action taken to clear or 
cancel? 
Nomenclature 
consistency 
How old is 
survey data? 
Discrepancies with 
IMSMA database 
Documentation complete 
(ref 1a) 
13 W 2-23/ 
2785 
CBU 
Strike 
Discredited Reconnaissance (survey) 
Ops Memo of 15/7/00 
Yes N/A No Yes 
14 W 2-23/ 
2786 
CBU 
Strike 
Discredited Reconnaissance (survey) 
Ops Memo of 15/7/00 
Yes N/A No Yes 
15 W 2-29/ 
2595 
CBU 
Strike 
EOD Response Confirmed clear see CR 1566 of 
3/9/04 
Manual Clearance 
Yes N/A Completion report 
describes uncleared 
area left, not in 
IMSMA 
Yes 
16 C19-22/ 
3926 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete Manual Clearance Yes N/A No, only date 
reference for Ops 
Memo 
Yes 
17 W 2-76/ 
2350 
CBU 
Strike 
Discredited Survey / Ops Memo of 21/11/01 Yes N/A Reference to Ops 
Memo of 21/11/01, 
TD only contain Ops 
Memo of 27.7.01 
Ops Memo of 21/11/01 
missing 
18 W 2-59/ 
3951 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete Manual Clearance subsurface Yes N/A No Yes (ELS Ops Memo of 
30/10/00 missing, but other 
documentation is sufficient) 
19 W 2-59/ 
2336 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete Manual Clearance subsurface Yes N/A No Yes (as above) 
20 W 2-59/ 
2343 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete Survey Yes N/A No Yes (as above) 
21 W 2-59/ 
2601 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete Survey Yes N/A No Yes (as above) 
22 W 2-59/ 
3953 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete Survey Yes N/A No Yes (as above) 
23 W2-14/ 
2646 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete Manual Clearance Subsurface Yes N/A No Yes 
24 W2-14/ 
2647 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete Manual Clearance Subsurface Yes N/A No Yes 
25 W2-14/ 
3917 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete Manual Clearance Subsurface Yes N/A No Yes 
26 C 9-11/ 
3002 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete Survey 
Ops Memo 14/3/00 
KFOR compound 
Yes N/A No, only date for Ops 
Memo (14 instead of 
9/3/00) 
Yes 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action 
taken to clear 
or cancel? 
Nomenclature  
consistency 
How old is survey 
data? 
Discrepancies with IMSMA database Documentation complete 
(ref 1a) 
27 W 2-30/ 
3266 
CBU 
Strike 
EOD Response 
(conf. clear) 
Manual 
Clearance 
Subsurface 
Yes N/A IMSMA does not contain information 
about remaining marked area, where a 
BLU container had been cleared down 
to 1,5 metres and then marked 
Yes 
28 C 19-28/ 
3884 
CBU 
Strike 
Discredited 
Ops Memo 
23/11/01 
Survey Yes N/A No Documentation of KFOR 
clearance not available 
29 C 19-19/ 
3200 
CBU 
Strike 
Discredited 
Ops Memo  
26/7/01 
Survey Yes N/A No Yes 
30 N 28-2/ 
2420 
CBU 
Strike 
Complete 
Ops Memo 
31/5/00 
Survey / KFOR 
Clearance 
Yes N/A No Documentation of KFOR 
clearance not available 
31 S 20-32/ 
900 
CBU 
Strike 
Conf. Clear 
Ops Memo 
Not assessible Yes N/A Not assessable without documents Only DA reports  in TD 
32 S24-31/ 
4266 
Minefield Suspended Manual Mine 
Clearance 
Yes N/A IMSMA status suspended, but task is 
completed 
Yes 
33 S24-31/ 
4237 
Minefield No status in 
IMSMA, conf. 
clear 
Survey 
Ops Memo 
Yes N/A Not assessible No paper documentation 
available 
34 E 7-39/ 
1662 
Minefield Cleared by 
Survey 
Survey Yes N/A DAs not in IMSMA, only accessible 
through MF numbers 
The TD only contained DA 
reports, the compl rep has 
been in the survey file. 
Details on MF 281 and 293 
not in TD, probably also in 
survey file. 
35 E 23-17/ 
1992 
Minefield Conf. Clear 
No Status 
Survey Yes N/A DA 1747 is not in IMSMA.  Yes 
36 C 9-6/ 
1224 
CBU 
Strike 
Conf. Clear 
No Status 
Survey Yes N/A No Yes 
37 W 2-28 
2714 
CBU 
Strike 
N/A N/A Yes N/A No Yes 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action 
taken to clear or 
cancel? 
Nomenclature 
consistency 
How old is 
survey data? 
Discrepancies with IMSMA 
database 
Documentation complete (ref 
1a) 
38 E 25-3/ 
1486 
CBU Strike Conf. Clear 
No status 
Survey Yes N/A No Yes 
39 C 3-15/ 
MF490 
Minefield Cleared Survey Yes N/A No Yes 
40 C 3-15/ 
MF 491 
Minefield Cleared Manual Clearance Yes N/A No Yes 
41 C 3-15/ 
MF731 
Minefield Cleared Manual Clearance Yes N/A No Yes 
42 C 3-15/ 
3948 
Minefield Conf. Clear 
No Status 
Survey Yes N/A No Discreditation report 
43 S 24-5/ 
548 
Minefield MCO Mine 
Complete 
Survey Yes N/A IMSMA has Completion and 
Discreditation report 
Completion & Discreditation 
Report missing in TD 
44 N28-1/  
2433 
CBU Strike Survey Task Surface cleared 
by KFOR 
Yes N/A No Yes 
45 E 7-41/ 
MF 284 
Minefield Completed Clearance Yes N/A No Yes 
46 W02-27, 
3756 
Minefield Complete Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
47 W02-27 
3738 
Minefield Complete  Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
48 E25-34 
2355 
CBU Strike N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
49 E25-35 
2356 
CBU Strike N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
50 N11-11 
4034 
CBU Strike Complete Sub surface Yes N/A No Yes 
51 W1-13 
3912 
 
CBU Strike Completed, Manual surface Yes  N/A Not entered as just surface cleared. 
DA indicated clear but no 
subsurface completion report, ref to 
Ops Memo 24.9.2001 indicating 
task is clear, suspension report not 
entered into IMSMA   
IMSMA discrepancy indicates 
either ops memo, discreditation or 
completion report is missing 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action 
taken to 
clear or 
cancel? 
Nomenclature 
consistency 
How old is survey 
data? 
Discrepancies with IMSMA database Documentation 
complete (ref 1a) 
52 S24-06 CBU 
Strike 
Completed Manual 
surface 
Yes N/A No Yes 
53 E25-58 CBU 
Strike 
Completed Manual 
surface 
Yes N/A IMSMA Shows complete, TD shows 
suspended surface task 
Yes, but IMSMA 
information not  
54 W2-78 
2413 
CBU 
Strike 
Completed Manual sub 
surface 
Yes N/A No Yes 
55 E10-1 CBU 
Strike 
Completed Survey Yes N/A No Yes 
56 W2-20 Minefield Completed Survey Yes N/A No Yes 
57 S20-18 CBU 
Strike 
Completed Manual 
surface  
Yes N/A Yes, GIS shows suspended as surface 
clearance only, but IMSMA status shows 
complete 
Yes 
58 W02-60 Minefield Cleared Manual 
subsurface 
Yes N/A No Yes 
59 S24-27 
3906 
CBU 
Strike 
Discredited Survey Yes N/A No Yes 
60 S20-35 
3275 
EOD Discredited Survey Yes N/A No Yes 
61 S20-21 
2548 
EOD Discredited Survey Yes N/A No Yes 
62 S20-23 
3994 
CBU 
Strike 
Discredited Surface 
clearance  
Yes N/A Yes, should be suspended  for assessment 
as a further  EOD Response task  
No, no completion 
reports 
63 E25-47 
2331 
CBU 
Strike / 
Minefield 
Completed Manual sub 
surface 
Yes N/A No Yes 
64 WO1-45 
4075 
Minefield Completed Manual sub 
surface 
Yes N/A No Yes 
65 W17-10 
2445 
CBU 
Strike 
Completed Manual sub 
surface 
Yes N/A Yes, part of the area is cleared, part 
surface cleared part uncleared and marked, 
the uncleared and surface cleared areas are 
not shown as such on IMSMA   
Yes 
66 C18-43 
2774 
CBU 
Strike 
Completed Manual sub 
surface 
Yes N/A No Yes 
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SN TD / DA No. Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action 
taken to clear or 
cancel? 
Nomenclature 
consistency 
How old is survey 
data? 
Discrepancies with IMSMA 
database 
Documentation 
complete (ref 1a) 
67 W17-5 
1871 
Minefield Complete Manual sub 
surface 
Yes N/A No Yes 
68 C13-15 
4028 
CBU Strike Complete Manual sub 
surface 
Yes N/A No Yes 
69 C13-15 
2571 
CBU Strike Complete Not known Yes N/A No Yes 
70 E25-56 
4032 
CBU Strike Complete Manual Surface 
only 
Yes N/A Yes, need to indicate for 
assessment for sub surface 
clearance and link to area 
north of the DA with just 
visually cleared areas 
Yes, but missing 
supporting letter 
71 W01-25 
2547 
CBU Strike Complete Manual Sub 
surface 
Yes N/A Yes, IMSMA status, okay but 
needs Completion report  1554 
data added to IMSMA record 
Yes, but IMSMA 
record should refer to 
the detail completion 
report  
72 E25-19 
1333 
Minefield Complete Not known Yes N/A Yes, IMSMA has no  
discreditation or clearance 
report reference 
IMSMA: refers to an 
Ops Memo that is not 
in the TD 
73 E25-19 
3610 
Minefield Complete Not known Yes N/A No,  Yes 
74 W02-03 
1833 
Minefield Complete Manual sub 
surface 
Yes N/A No Yes 
75 W02-58 
3556 
CBU Strike Complete Manual sub 
surface 
Yes N/A No Yes 
76 W02-32 
2384_ 
CBU Strike Complete Manual sub 
surface 
Yes N/A No  Yes 
77 W02-572 
2562 
CBU Strike Complete Manual sub 
surface  
Yes N/A No Yes 
78 C13-22 
2576 
CBU Strike KFOR 
responsibility 
Not known Yes N/A No Yes 
79 C13-23 
2513 
CBU Strike KFOR 
Responsibility 
Not known Yes N/A No Yes 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action taken to 
clear or cancel? 
Nomenclature 
consistency 
How old is 
survey data? 
Discrepancies with 
IMSMA database 
Documentation 
complete (ref 1a) 
80 C13-24c 
2021 
CBU Strike KFOR 
Responsibility 
Not known Yes N/A No Yes 
81 N21-2 
4071 
CBU Strike Discreditation Manual sub surface Yes N/A No Yes 
82 W01-29 
2557 
CBU Strike Complete Manual sub surface Yes N/A No Yes 
83 E7-44 
3886 
Minefield Complete Manual   Yes N/A No Yes 
84 E7-44 
3385 
Minefield Complete Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
85 E7-44 
3384e 
Minefield Complete Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
86 E7-44 
1705 
Minefield Complete Manual  Yes N/A No Yes 
87 E7-44 
1713 
Minefield Complete Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
88 E7-44 
3689 
Minefield Complete Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
89 E7-44 
1706 
Minefield Complete Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
90 E7-46 
3378 
Minefield Complete Manual and MDD Yes N/A No Yes 
91 E7-46 
3379e 
Minefield Complete Manual and MDD Yes N/A No Yes 
92 E7-46 
3380 
Minefield Complete Manual and MDD Yes N/A No Yes 
93 E7-40 
1674 
Minefield Confirmed clear Manual and MDD Yes N/A No Yes 
94 E7-40 
1073 
Minefield Confirmed clear Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
95 E7-40 
1673 
Minefield Confirmed clear Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
96 S24-25 
2764 
CBU Strike Complete Manual sub surface Yes N/A No Yes 
 54 
 
SN TD / DA No. Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action taken 
to clear or cancel? 
Nomenclature 
consistency 
How old is 
survey data? 
Discrepancies with IMSMA 
database 
Documentation 
complete (ref 1a) 
97 W02-27 
2396 
 
CBU Strike Complete Manual surface Yes N/A Small uncleared / unclearable 
area not indicated in IMSMA
Yes 
98 W02-27 
2397 
See 2396       
99 W02-27 
2714 
CBU Strike Complete Manual surface Yes N/A No Yes 
100 W02-27 
2723 
CBU Strike Complete Manual surface Yes N/A Yes. IMSMA showed 
complete, but only surface 
clearance conducted. 
Yes 
101 S5-25 / 2959 CBU Strike Complete – 
Discredited 
Level 1 survey in 
IMSMA 
Yes N/A Yes. ‘Cleared’ in IMSMA 
through level 1 survey but no 
report in TD 
No. Survey report 
missing in TD 
102 S20-04 / 
3847 
CBU Strike Surface cleared Surface clearance & 
Ops Memo in 
IMSMA 
Yes N/A Yes. Task ‘cleared by surface 
clearance’ in IMSMA but no 
clearance report in TD – only 
suspension report. IMSMA 
closes DA with Ops Memo 
but missing in TD 
No. Clearance Report 
and Ops Memo missing 
in TD 
103 S20-05 / 
2048  
CBU Strike Complete – 
subsurface 
cleared 
Subsurface 
Clearance + 
Completion Report 
+ reference to Ops 
Directive in 
IMSMA 
No. Task 
‘cleared’ but 
small piece of 
ground uncleared. 
Task closed by 
‘Ops Directive’ 
N/A Yes. Completion report 
covers all DAs but in 
IMSMA only DAs 2048 and 
2050 state that a completion 
report is available 
Yes 
104 C18-12 / 
2515 / 
2516 
CBU  Strike Discredited Subsurface 
clearance to 10cm + 
completion report in 
IMSMA 
No N/A Yes. One DA flagged as 
discredited but has actually 
been surface cleared 
No. Clearance report 
detailing 50cm 
subsurface not in TD 
105 W2-66 / 2640 
/ 2639 
CBU Strike Complete – 
surface cleared 
Surface clearance + 
Ops Memo on 13 
Aug 01 in IMSMA 
No N/A Yes. Cleared in IMSMA by 
Ops Memo but only 
suspension report available 
in TD 
No. Ops Memo missing 
in TD 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action taken to 
clear or cancel? 
Nomenclatu
re 
consistency 
How old is 
survey data?
Discrepancies with IMSMA 
database 
Documentation complete (ref 
1a) 
106 S24-02 / 
2323 
CBU Strike Cleared by survey Cleared by Ops Memo in 
IMSMA 
No N/A No No. 2 Ops Memos (30/10/00 & 
21/11/01)  mentioned in 
IMSMA but missing in TD 
107 S24-02 / 
2322 
CBU Strike Subsurface 
cleared (no 
clearance depth) 
Clearance + completion 
report in IMSMA 
Yes. Marked 
as minefield 
in IMSMA 
but actually 
cluster strike 
N/A Subsurface cleared in 
IMSMA but no depth given 
in TD – suggests surface 
clearance only 
No 
108 S24-02 / 
2560 
CBU Strike Cleared by survey Surface clearance in 
IMSMA 
Yes N/A Yes. Suspension report in TD 
but IMSMA states DA is 
cleared by survey 
No. Ops Memo (21/11/00) for 
survey clearance missing in TD 
109 C13-17 / 
1993 /  
1995 /  
CBU Strike Complete – 
subsurface 
cleared 
Subsurface clearance + 
completion report in 
IMSMA 
No N/A No Yes 
110 W2-49 
2337 /  
CBU Strike Complete – 
surface cleared 
Surface clearance then 
suspended. MACC Ops 
Memo then closed task 
based in IMSMA on low 
priority for subsurface 
clearance 
No N/A Yes. DA has been closed but 
only surface cleared. Change 
status to suspended 
No. No cover page 
111 C09-07 / 
2635 / 
2636 
CBU Strike Complete – 
discredited 
Survey Yes N/A No No. No cover page in TD 
112 C3-17 / 
2536 
CBU Strike Complete Cleared by Ops Memo in 
IMSMA 
No N/A Yes. DA suspended with 
surface clearance and 
uncleared area remaining but 
IMSMA marks task as closed
No. Ops Memo (13/08/01) 
missing in TD 
113 C3-17 /  
2387 
CBU Strike Complete Cleared by Ops Memo in 
IMSMA 
No N/A Yes. DA completed but no 
survey or clearance report in 
TD 
No. Ops Memo (13/08/01) and 
survey report missing in TD 
but mentioned in IMSMA 
114 C19-32 /  
2042 / 
3938 
CBU Strike Complete – EOD 
response 
Clearance + completion 
report in IMSMA 
No N/A No Yes 
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SN TD / DA 
No. 
Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action taken to 
clear or cancel? 
Nomenclature 
consistency 
How old is 
survey data? 
Discrepancies with IMSMA 
database 
Documentation 
complete (ref 1a) 
115 C09-09 / 
2034 / 
2899 / 
2900 
CBU Strike / 
Minefield 
Complete – 
KFOR cleared 
KFOR Clearance in 
IMSMA 
No N/A Yes. IMSMA status should 
be changed from complete to 
KFOR responsibility 
No. KFOR completion 
report not included in 
TD 
116 N12-02 / 
2892 
CBU Strike Complete Surface clearance + 
discreditation survey 
in IMSMA 
No. Tech Survey 
Form used for 
discreditation 
report. Completion 
report used for EOD 
call out  
N/A Yes. Cleared in IMSMA but 
actually KFOR responsibility
Yes 
117 E07-49 / 
187 / 188 / 
189 / 190 
Minefield Cleared by 
survey 
Survey + Survey 
Report in IMSMA 
Yes N/A Yes. All minefields cleared 
in IMSMA but insufficient 
evidence in TD  of clearance/ 
survey reports 
No. Cover page, map or 
survey/ clearance report 
missing in TD 
118 E07-49 / 
229 / 264 
Minefield Cleared by 
clearance 
Clearance + 
completion report in 
IMSMA 
Yes N/A No No. No cover page or 
map in TD 
119 E07-49 / 
872 / 876 / 
3830 / 
4277 / 
4279 
Minefield Cleared Clearance + 
completion report in 
IMSMA 
Yes N/A No Yes 
120 W1-44 / 
3228 / 
3231 / 
3494 
Minefield Cleared by 
clearance and 
discredited 
Clearance and 
discreditation reports 
Yes N/A No No 
121 E7-25 /  Deleted by DE      
122 E7-25 / 
221 / 222 
Minefield Cleared by 
clearance 
Clearance Yes N/A Yes.  Yes 
123 W01-43 / 
418 / 434 
Minefield Cleared by 
clearance 
Clearance Yes N/A Yes. All minefields are 
cleared in IMSMA but no 
clearance report in TD  
No. Clearance reports 
missing in TD 
124 W01-43 / 
436 / 431 
Minefield Cleared by 
clearance / 
suspended 
Clearance and handed 
over to Albania 
MACC 
Yes N/A No Yes 
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SN TD / DA No. Type IMSMA 
Status 
What action 
taken to clear or 
cancel? 
Nomenclature 
consistency 
How old is 
survey data?
Discrepancies with IMSMA 
database 
Documentation 
complete (ref 1a) 
125 W01-43 / 3277 Minefield Cleared by Ops 
Memo 
Cleared by Ops 
Memo 
Yes N/A Yes. DA closed by Ops Memo 
but missing from TD 
No. Ops Memo 
missing in TD 
126 W01-43 / 3225 Minefield N/A – DA not in 
IMSMA 
N/A – DA not in 
IMSMA or TD 
N/A N/A N/A – DA not in IMSMA or TD No. All documentation 
missing in TD 
127 W01-43 / 3248 Minefield Cleared – 
discredited 
Suspension report 
in IMSMA 
No. DA discredited 
by suspension report  
N/A Yes. DA closed but no supporting 
documentation in TD 
No. Suspension report 
missing in TD 
128 W01-43 / 1818 Minefield Cleared by Ops 
Memo 
Cleared by Ops 
Memo 
Yes N/A Yes. DA closed but Ops Memo 
missing from TD 
No. Minefield report 
& Ops Memo missing 
from TD 
129 W08-03 / 3819 Minefield Cleared – no 
status 
Cleared by Ops 
Memo 
Yes N/A Yes. DA closed by Ops Memo 
but missing from TD 
No. Ops Memo 
missing in TD 
130 N21-07 / 517 
(DA) 
Minefield Cleared by survey 
(no status) 
Cleared by Ops 
Memo 
No. No status in 
IMSMA 
N/A Yes. DA closed by Ops Memo 
but missing from TD 
No. Ops Memo 
missing in TD 
131 W08-04 / 74 Minefield Cleared by survey 
(no status) 
Cleared by Ops 
Memo 
No. No status in 
IMSMA 
N/A Yes. DA closed by Ops Memo 
but missing from TD 
No. Ops Memo 
missing in TD 
132 C 13-05 Deleted by DE      
133 S05-10 / 548 / 
549 / 551 
Minefield Cleared by 
clearance 
Clearance + 
clearance report 
Yes N/A No Yes 
134 E26-4 
2456 
BAC Complete Sub surface Yes N/A No Yes 
135 E26-15 
1694 
Minefield Complete Manual  Yes N/A No Yes 
136 E26-15 
1693 
Minefield Complete Manual  Yes N/A No Yes 
137 E26-15 
1695 
Minefield Complete Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
138 E26-15 
1695 
Minefield Complete Manual Yes N/A No  Yes 
139 N21-16 
3667 
Minefield Complete Manual Yes N/A No Yes 
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Annex B: Assessment of selected Task Dossiers part 2 (qualitative / analytical) 
 
SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority 
classification clear?24 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task?25 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?26  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate?27  
Action required? 
1 W02-67/ 
2377 
Yes N/A Yes Yes IMSMA: Change status to complete, 
Doc: Add DAs 
2 W2-18/ 
2376 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
3 S20-29/ 
1148 
Yes N/A Yes Yes Change status in IMSMA to “KFOR 
Responsibility” 
4 S20-30/ 
2332 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
5 S16-13/ 
1521 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
6 N28-1/ 
3894 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
7 N28-1/ 2534 Yes N/A Yes Yes No, KFOR deals with it. Doc. follow-
up, add cover page 
8 N28-1/  
1998 
Yes Yes N/A Yes Recorded outstanding task for sub-
surface clearance, but in Serb area, 
therefore KFOR responsibility. 
IMSMA: untick conf. clear for 1998 
9 N28-1/  
2432 
Yes Yes Yes Yes No, KFOR deals with it. MSMA: 
change status to complete 
10 N28-1/  
2435 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Recorded outstanding clearance task, 
but in Serb area, therefore KFOR 
responsibility. 
                                                 
24 File processing clear: OKPCC internal file administration clear, nomenclature understandable and consistent, continuation tasks identified. Priority classification clear (only for 
current tasks): OKPCC priority setting decision trail clear and documented, survey data available (not older than 6 months)  
25 „Sufficient“ is defined as: 1) for survey tasks: DA report available, 2) for clearance tasks: DA report, Survey report or Tasking order available, clear and complete 
26 „Appropriate“ is defined as: 1) for clearance: documentation complete, argumentation understandable. 2) for discredited areas: documentation complete, argumentation 
understandable: Survey conducted, no signs of fighting, mines or UXO, interviews with affected persons conducted, area used regularly, no accidents 
27 „Appropriate“ is defined as: documentation is complete, file processing understandable, priority classification clear, nomenclature clear, argumentation understandable, no 
other evidence (accident, new DA report) 
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority classification 
clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
11 W 2-23/ 
2783 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
12 W 2-23/ 
2784 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
13 W 2-23/ 
2785 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
14 W 2-23/ 
2786 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
15 W 2-29/ 
2595 
Yes N/A Yes New status needed for 
completed tasks with 
small areas remaining 
uncleared, eg due to 
high metal 
contamination? 
IMSMA: Indicate uncleared area left 
from Compl. Rep. 1566 
Change status? 
16 C19-22/ 3926 Yes N/A Yes, the areas were 
ploughed in 2000, 
however, in 2005 BLUs 
were found. LL: Future 
tasks consider ploughed 
areas still may require 
subsurface clearance. 
Yes IMSMA: Correct Ops Memo dates to 
19/10/00 for all three DAs, note in DA 
3926 Compl. Rep. 1610 
17 W 2-76/ 
2350 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No, because the Ops Memo of 27/7/01 
is clear enough for discreditation 
18 W 2-59/ 
3951 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
19 W 2-59/ 
2336 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
20 W 2-59/ 
2343 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
21 W 2-59/ 
2601 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
22 W 2-59/ 
3953 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority classification 
clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
23 W2-14/ 
2646 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
24 W2-14/ 
2647 
Yes N/A Yes Yes IMSMA: Ref 2647 same as 2646 
25 W2-14/ 
3917 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
26 C 9-11/ 
3002 
Status should be KFOR 
responsibility and not 
complete 
N/A Yes Yes IMSMA: change status from complete 
to KFOR responsibility  
27 W 2-30/ 
3266 
Yes, but DA report 3266 
refered to a VJ minefield, 
which was discredited, not 
to a CBU strike. Formally, 
a new DA report could 
have been produced for the 
CBU strike area, factually, 
it would not have changed 
anything about the result. 
N/A Yes Yes IMSMA: Add description of 
uncleared area to Compl. Rep. 1569 
28 C 19-28/ 
3884 
Yes N/A Yes, but the discrediting 
Survey/ Ops Memo is only 
a handwritten post-it 
Yes No 
29 C 19-19/ 
3200 
Yes, but BACTEC Ops 
Memo not clear 
N/A Yes, but the discrediting 
Survey/ Ops Memo is only 
a handwritten post-it 
Yes No 
30 N 28-2/ 
2420 
Yes N/A Yes Yes, the task is a 
KFOR base cleared by 
KFOR 
No 
31 S 20-32/ 
900 
Not assessable Not assessable Not assessable Not assessable Search missing documents, add to file, 
assess 
32 S24-31/ 
4266 
Yes N/A Yes Yes, but IMSMA 
status needs 
rectification 
IMSMA: Change status from 
suspended to completed. Check status 
for other DAs at Dulje pass, change to 
completed if completion report 
available. 
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority classification 
clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
33 S24-31/ 
4237 
Not assessable Not assessable Not assessable Not assessable Search missing documents, add to file, 
assess 
34 E 7-39/ 
1662 
No, the survey-completion 
report was not in the TD 
N/A Yes Yes Sort documents: put survey- 
completions in according TD (MF 281 
and 293). Check MF281 and 293 
survey-completion reports IMSMA: 
Enter/ link DAs and MF to compl. 
rep.  
35 E 23-17/ 
1992 
Yes N/A Yes Yes IMSMA: 1747 deleted because it is 
the same as 1992. Add status for 
1992. 
36 C 9-6/ 
1224 
Yes N/A Yes Yes IMSMA: add status  
37 W 2-28 
2714 
Yes N/A N/A N/A No 
38 E 25-3/ 
1486 
Yes  N/A Yes Yes IMSMA: add status.28  
39 C 3-15/ 
MF490 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
40 C 3-15/ 
MF 491 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
41 C 3-15/ 
MF731 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
42 C 3-15/ 
3948 
Yes N/A Yes, reference the above 3 
cleared areas, the survey 
has rather been a 
confirmation that no other 
DAs are left in the place. 
Yes Put discreditation report in TD. 
IMSMA: Add status. 
                                                 
28  Note on DA 1486: DA 1486 discredited, understandable. In discreditation report reference to Cluster Strike Area at other grid reference (EM 043 895). Checking in IMSMA: 
Grid reference refers to 2759 and 2769. Both DAs have been discredited through survey later. In 2004 a Cluster Strike Area was reported to the HI team working at another strike 
not too far away. The strike was about 3-4 kilometer further uphill from the originally reported area (2759, 2769). The area is densely wooded and steep. The strike was 
subsequently cleared (CR 1536), missing in IMSMA: perimeter of cleared area, devices found, comment on uncleared area not clear. 
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority classification 
clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
43 S 24-5/ 
548 
Yes N/A Survey reports indicate 
population still perceive 
mines 
Yes Re-visit area to ensure the reported 
second hazardous area has been dealt 
with. 
44 N28-1/  
2433 
Yes N/A Yes Yes Recorded outstanding task for sub-
surface clearance, but in Serb area, 
therefore KFOR responsibility 
45 E 7-41/ 
MF 284 
Yes N/A Yes Yes Despite proper procedures and 
documentation, clearance of further 
areas became necessary in 2005 and 
PMA 2s were found. For this reason, 
the locals are also not confident about 
other cleared areas. Community 
liaison / survey required, including the 
whole of the TD. 
46 W02-27 3756 Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
47 W02-27 
3738 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
48 E25-34 
2355 
N/A N/A N/A N/A None 
49 E25-35 
2356 
N/A N/A N/A N/A None 
50 N11-11 
4034 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
51 W1-13 
 
No, because Ops Memo is 
not available  
N/A No, because Ops Memo is 
not available, so measures 
not auditable   
No Find and assess Ops Memo. 
If not found or argumentation not 
clear: survey. And re-assess  
52 S24-06 Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
53 E25-58 Yes N/A No, Suspension 
appropriate, or record as 
future task  
No IMSMA: Low priority future task.  
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority classification 
clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
54 W2-78 Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
55 E10-1 Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
56 W2-20 Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
57 S20-18 Yes  N/A No, Suspension  
appropriate 
No IMSMA: low priority future task. 
IMSMA action 
58 W02-60 Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
59 S24-27 Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
60 S20-35 Yes N/A Yes, GP bombing not CBU Yes None 
61 S20-21 Yes N/A Yes, GP bombing not CBU Yes None 
62 S20-23 No N/A No, should show 
subsurface clearance still 
required for BLUs and one 
GP bomb 
No IMSMA: low priority future task, 
action only when landuse changes. 
63 E25-47 Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
64 WO1-45 
 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
65 W17-10 
2445 
Yes N/A Yes New status needed for 
completed tasks with 
small areas remaining 
uncleared, eg due to 
high metal 
contamination? 
IMSMA: Indicate uncleared area left.  
66 C18-43 Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
67 W17-5 Yes N/A Yes Yes None, an amalgam of suspension and 
clearance reports completed the site 
68 C13-15 
4028 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
69 C13-15 
2571 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
70 E25-56 
4032 
No N/A No No IMSMA: low priority future task, 
action only when change of landuse. 
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority classification 
clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
71 W01-25  
2547 
Yes N/A Yes Yes IMSMA clearance report 1554 detail 
with six uncleared areas needs to be 
added to data base for reference 
72 E25-19 
1333 
Yes N/A No, it might be, but 
supporting  documentation 
missing 
No Search documents, assess  
73 E25-19 
3610 
Yes N/A Yes Yes   None 
74 W02-03 
1833 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
75 W02-58 
3556 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
76 W02-32 
2384_ 
Yes N/A Yes  Yes None 
77 W02-52 
2562 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
78 C13-22 
2576 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
79 C13-23 
2513 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
80 C13-24c 
2021 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
81 N21-2 
4071 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
82 W01-29 
2557 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
83 E7-44 
3886 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
84 E7-44 
3385 
Yes N/A Yes Yes TD E7-44, serial 84 – 89. These 
related DA numbers and MF numbers 
and  took much time to correlate, 
some  
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority 
classification clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?  
OKPCC task 
status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
85 E7-44 
3384e 
Yes N/A Yes Yes areas were cleared and supported by 
completed clearance reports, 
86 E7-44 
1705 
Yes N/A Yes Yes Others by reference to Ops Memos which are  
87 E7-44 
1713 
Yes N/A Yes Yes in the task dossiers, and finally referenced by 
a comprehensive summary file note 
instruction,   
88 E7-44 
3689 
Yes N/A Yes Yes written by Albie 
89 E7-44 
1706 
Yes N/A Yes Yes The explanations when aggregated together 
indicate clearance or reasonable 
discreditation, more supporting  
documentation may be found in the 
verification / discreditation files which 
should be cross referenced to the task 
dossiers 
90 E7-46 
3378 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
91 E7-46 
3379e 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
92 E7-46 
3380 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
93 E7-40 
1674 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
94 E7-40 
1073 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
95 E7-40 
1673 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
96 S24-25 
2764 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
97 W02-27 
2396 
Yes N/A No No IMSMA: Cleared, but small uncleared/ 
unclearable area left. 
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority 
classification clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
98 W02-27 
2397 
See 2396     
99 W02-27 
2714 
Yes N/A No No None 
100 W02-27 
2723 
Yes N/A No No IMSMA: low priority future task, action 
only when change of landuse. 
101 S5-25 / 2959 No. Insufficient 
evidence for DA to be 
closed 
N/A No. Level 1 survey 
undertaken, but task marked 
as surface cleared (as 
opposed to cleared by 
survey) even though not all 
the area has been 
investigated (i.e. bushy 
areas). AT mine evidence 
report but no further 
clearance undertaken before 
DA closed. 
No. The DA should be 
outstanding. The level 1 
survey is not sufficient to 
close a verified BLU strike 
and a suspected AT 
minefield (items found 
during first survey) 
Yes, search missing documents with 
discreditation report and reassess, if in 
doubt revisit site and confirm situation 
102 S20-04 / 
3847 
No. TD classified as 
cleared but comment in 
suspension report says 
‘work would continue 
after suspension’, but no 
further work undertaken 
N/A No. DA has been closed by 
an Ops Memo in IMSMA 
that states that subsurface 
clearance is not required as 
land is only used for grazing. 
In survey reports, however, 
the land is classified as 
cultivated for crops. 
No. DA classified as cleared 
but TD says that task is 
suspended. Surface clearance 
only has taken place.  
Yes, if land use changes 
103 S20-05 / 
2048 
Yes  N/A No. Uncleared area closed by 
‘Ops Directive’ but no 
reference as to what or where 
Ops Directive is. No further 
details in TD. 
No. Task is marked as 
complete but some area is 
left uncleared (as it is highly 
contaminated with metal). 
No suitable task 
nomenclature available 
IMSMA: ensure uncleared area left is 
accurately recorded. Link other DAs to 
Completion Report. 
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority classification 
clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and measures 
appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
104 C18-12 / 2515 
2516 
No. IMSMA one task as 
discredited when it has 
actually been subsurface 
cleared 
N/A Yes No. Clearance depth 
should be changed to 50cm 
as detailed in missing 
completion report 
IMSMA as described 
105 W2-66 / 2640 / 
2639 
Yes N/A Unknown - depends on details 
in Ops Memo 
Unknown - depends on 
details in Ops Memo 
If ops memo can not be located? 
106 S24-02 / 2323 Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
107 S24-02 / 2322 Yes N/A Not possible to say as no 
clearance depth stated in TD 
No. No evidence of 
subsurface clearance in TD
IMSMA: Link DAs. Small 
uncleared area left? Match with 
DAs 1598,4341 in one TD. 
108 S24-02 / 2560 No. DA cleared by survey 
but no supporting 
documentation 
N/A No. Surface clearance only on 
suspected CBU strike. DA then 
closed by ops memo 
No. TD is suspended, 
IMSMA is cleared by 
survey 
IMSMA: Link DAs. Small 
uncleared area left? Match with 
DAs 1598,4341 in one TD. 
109 C13-17 / 1993 / 
1995 
Yes 
 
N/A Yes Yes No 
110 W2-49 
2337 
Yes N/A No. Clearance agency 
recommendation is that ‘area 
will require subsurface 
clearance at a later date’ and 
that terrain in agricultural area. 
MACC however has closed 
task on basis that it is low 
priority clearance 
No. Task should remain 
suspended as only surface 
clearance undertaken and 
clearance agency state that 
subsurface clearance 
required 
Yes, if land use changes 
IMSMA: Change to only surface, 
low priority, action only when 
landuse changes 
111 C09-07 / 2635 / 
2636 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority classification 
clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
112 C3-17 / 2536 No. No explanation as to 
why a suspended DA is 
closed 
N/A No. Suspension report 
states that uncleared area 
remains as no work took 
place on DA, but DA 
closed without evidence of 
further clearance or survey 
No Yes. To clarify whether uncleared area 
remains 
Note by PB/VB: Ops memo located 
during assessment, no action required 
113 C3-17 /  2387 No. No explanation as to 
why the DA is closed in 
IMSMA 
N/A Unknown - depends on 
details in Ops Memo 
Unknown - depends on 
details in Ops Memo 
If Ops Memo cannot be located? 
Note by PB/VB: Ops memo located 
during assessment, no action required 
114 C19-32  
/ 2042 / 3938 
Yes N/A Yes No. Task marked as 
complete and EOD 
response in IMSMA, 
which contradict each 
other 
No 
115 C09-09 / 
2034 / 2899 / 
2900 
Yes N/A Unknown as KFOR 
clearance report and 
actions taken not available 
Yes IMSMA: Change to KFOR 
responsibility 
116 N12-02 / 
2892 
Yes N/A No. Surface clearance 
undertaken on a number of 
occasions. Survey has then 
discredited DAs without 
any subsurface clearance 
and has become KFOR 
responsibility 
No. Task ticked as 
confirmed clear when 
there is some ‘uncleared 
area’ left 
IMSMA: Change to KFOR 
responsibility 
117 E07-49 / 187 
/ 188 / 189 / 
190 
Yes N/A Unknown – depends on 
details in survey report 
which are not available in 
either IMSMA or TD 
No. No survey report 
available in either 
IMSMA or TD to justify 
closure 
Yes. If survey report cannot be located 
in files as local info suggests existence 
of mines 
118 E07-49 / 229 
/ 264 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
119 E07-49 / 872, 
876, 3830, 
4277, 4279 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority classification 
clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and 
measures appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
120 W1-44 / 3228 
/ 3231 / 3494 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
121 E07-25 /  Deleted by DE     
122 E07-25 / 221 
/ 222 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No, only delete DA numbers for 
clarification 
123 W01-43 / 418 
/ 434 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
124 W01-43 / 436 
/ 431 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
125 W01-43 / 
3277 
Yes N/A Unknown – Ops Memo not 
available 
Unknown - depends 
on details in Ops 
Memo 
If Ops Memo cannot be located? 
126 W01-43 / 
3225 
N/A – DA not in IMSMA 
or TD 
N/A N/A – DA not in IMSMA 
or TD 
N/A – DA not in 
IMSMA or TD 
If DA documentation cannot be 
located? 
127 W01-43 / 
3248 
No. Task marked as 
cleared by discreditation 
but only suspension report 
mentioned (no 
discreditation report) 
N/A No. Suspended DA cannot 
be cleared/discredited 
without further 
investigation 
No. DA cannot be 
discredited without a 
discreditation report 
If discreditation report cannot be 
located? 
128 W01-43 / 
1818 
Yes N/A Unknown – Ops Memo 
and DA report not 
available 
Unknown – Ops 
Memo and DA report 
not available 
If Ops Memo cannot be located? 
129 W08-03 / 
3819 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
130 N21-07 / 517 
(DA) 
Yes N/A Unknown – Ops Memo 
and DA report not 
available 
Unknown – Ops 
Memo and DA report 
not available 
If Ops Memo cannot be located? 
IMSMA: Add status 
131 W08-04 / 74 Yes N/A Unknown – Ops Memo 
and DA report not 
available 
Unknown – Ops 
Memo and DA report 
not available 
If Ops Memo cannot be located? 
132 C 13-05 Deleted by DE     
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SN TD/DA No. OKPCC file processing 
and priority classification 
clear? 
Info sufficient for 
demining agency to 
conduct task? 
Clearance / cancellation 
documentation and measures 
appropriate?  
OKPCC task status 
appropriate? 
Action required? 
133 S05-10 / 548 
/ 549 / 551 
Yes N/A Yes Yes No 
134 E26-4 
2456 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
135 E26-15 
1694 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
136 E26-15 
1693 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
137 E26-15 
1695 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
138 E26-15 
1695 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
139 N21-16 
3667 
Yes N/A Yes Yes None 
 
 
Note for all tables: SN 1-45 were done by Vera Bohle, SN 46-100 and 134-139 by Phil Bean, assessment team members, and SN 101-133 by David Elliot, HALO Trust. Whilst 
the assessment team agreed on the “Action required” for all SNs, the individual commentaries are attributed to the individual authors. Dangerous Areas selected by HALO 
include SN 1-34, 45, 51-95 and 101-130.  
Annex C: List of DAs / areas to be (re-)visited by KPC 
 
Areas identified for re-survey following the review of the Task Dossiers: 
 
 SN TD/DA Priority 
1 43 S 24 – 05 / 548 No 
2 45 E 07 – 41 / 284 et al  Yes (Leskovica) 
3 117 E 07 – 49 / 187, 188 Yes (Krivenik) 
 
The OKPCC MRE Officer or a Community Liaison qualified KPC staff member 
should visit the following places to assess the situation and to explain the Kosovo 
mine/UXO reporting procedures to the villagers, to OSCE and to the Municipality: 
 
? Gjocaj (near Junik) 
? Jasicq (near Junik) 
? Dimce (FYROM border near Deneral Jankovic) 
? Nerodime village (Ferizaj Municipality, hilltops Rrafshi I Kodres se Madhe 
and Kodra e Shullanit 
? Kalaja Fortress (river junction to Maja, Ferizaj Municipality) 
? Irznic (near Decane) 
? Milaj (Prizren Municipality, explain cleared areas again) 
 
KFOR should be made aware of the fact that the Serb community in Lipljan has 
concerns about UXO, if not happened before. 
 
If accessible and not too remote, the priority for sub-surface BAC should be re-
assessed next year for the following Task Dossiers:  
 
 SN TD / DA Type Surface 
cleared 
Priority Sub-
surface 
Remarks 
1 53 E25-58 / 148529 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
2 57 S20-18 / 2964 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
3 62 S20-23 / 3994 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
4 70 E25-56 / 403230 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
5 100 W02-27 / 2723 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
6 102 S 20-04 / 3847 CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
7 110 W 02 – 49 (10 
DAs) 
CBU 
Strike 
Yes Low Further action only 
when change of 
landuse 
                                                 
29 Jezerc, visited during assessment field trip, confirmed low priority, despite the survey report proposing high 
priority. 
30 Kamena Glava, visited during assessment field trip, confirmed no change of landuse 
 72
 
Add to the “Future Task” list: 
 
 DA IMSMA Status Remarks 
1 3943 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, MAT 
survey 2005 
2 2550 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, very 
low priority, no 
action now 
3 2756 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, low 
priority 
4 4325 Future Task 
EOD Response 
CBU strike, MAT 
survey 2003 
5 3880 Future Task Mines, HALO 
survey 2005, 
priority 
6 4308 Future Task 
EOD Response 
Mines, MAT survey 
2003 
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